Justice Ginsburg and the Injury in Fact Element of
Standing
INTRODUCTION

On August 3, 1993, the United States Senate confirmed the
appointment ofJudge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court
of the United States.' During her tenure on the Court, Justice
Ginsburg will influence many areas of the law. In particular, however, Justice Ginsburg can certainly sway the Court with respect to
standing.'
In two recent cases, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation' and
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife4 , the Supreme Court strictly construed
the "injury in fact" element of the standing test, thus precluding
actions seeking to redress environmental harm from reaching trial
on the merits.' It is possible that this result is due to the inability of
the Supreme Court to fit the kinds of injuries often pleaded by
1 Senate Confirms Ginsburg by96-to-3 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at Al. Under
the Constitution of the United States, once the President nominates a person to the
position of Supreme Court Justice, the Senate must give its consent to the nomination. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2 See infra notes 115-216 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's current
stance on the standing issue in the environmental context). Federal standing doctrine is a procedural area of the law that derives from the United States Constitution's
Article III requirement that the courts of the United States only adjudicate cases or
controversies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. ("The judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority... [and] to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party. ..."). Standing is discussed
at length in Section II of this Comment. For an overview of the standing requirements, see Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86
HARv. L. REv. 645, 679-81 (1973) (citations omitted). For the basis of the current
standing requirements, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (asserting that the
standing requirement "assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a
claim of injury in fact"); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977) ("[P]laintiff must show that he himself is injured
. "); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (holding that the destruction
of the natural beauty of land and other aesthetic elements can satisfy the injury in fact
requirement); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970) (noting that a plaintiff must show that he has an injury in fact within the
'zone of interests" protected by the relevant statute); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962) (stating that the purpose of standing is to ensure that the litigants are truly
adversarial).
3 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
4 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
5 Id. at 2137, 2146; National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 894.
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environmental public interest groups into the traditional standing
test.6 Nevertheless, the divided nature of the Court in both National Wildlife Federation and Defenders of Wildlife suggest that Justice
Ginsburg can shift the majority of the Court to embrace less stringent standing guidelines. 7 Fortunately, Justice Ginsburg's opinions
on the D.C. Circuit point to this result.8
The Supreme Court's reluctance to hear actions brought by
public interest groups may stem from the nature of the injuries
that those groups claim to suffer.9 For example, while the plant
and animal species of our planet are disappearing due to the loss
of the natural habitats that sustain them, 10 this is not a traditional
"inquiry" that our legal system will redress. Nevertheless, due to
greater media coverage and increasingly compelling scientific evidence, other problems such as ozone depletion, global warming,
and rain forest destruction have recently moved to the center of
the world stage.1 1
The United States Constitution relegates the task of solving
problems such as environmental degradation to the executive and
legislative branches of government.1 2 These two branches are in a
6 See infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional test of
standing).
7 See infra notes 232-259 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's
apparent position on the doctrine of standing).
8 See infra notes 232-259 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's
anticipated impact upon environmental standing).
9 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2137 (citation omitted) (observing that
the plaintiff claimed as its injury an increase in the extinction rate of endangred species); National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 894, 896 (noting that the National Wildlife
Federation asserted that its members' "recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment" of
the land at issue was at risk).
10 See Edward 0. Wilson, Threats to Biodiversity, 261 Sci. AM. 108, 111 (1989). Experts believe that nearly 40% of the world's species live in tropical rain forests. See
Anne Batchelor, The Preservationof Wildlife Habitat in Ecosystems: Towards a New Direction Under InternationalLaw to Prevent Species' Extinction, 3 FLA. INT'L. L. J. 307, 309 n.9
(1988) (citing Robert C. Stowe, United States ForeignPolicy and the Conservation of Natural Resources: The Case of Tropical Deforestation, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 55, 57 (1987)).
Plants and animals are not disappearing solely because of natural selection, or "survival of the fittest," but rather are disappearing as a result of the actions of humankind. Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity: Emerging
Recognition of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under InternationalEnvironmental
Law, 59 TENN L. REv. 735, 741 (1992). The primary factors responsible for environmental degradation are pollution, modem forestry practices, industrial agriculture,
habitat fragmentation and destruction, and the misuse of animal and plant species.
Id. (citations omitted).
11 See, e.g., Senator Al Gore, Address at Rio Earth Summit, in 59 TENN.. L. REv. 645,
648 (1992) ("I believe that the central organizing principle in the post-Cold War
world must become the task of saving the earth's environment.").
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
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position to marshal the resources of the world's nations to face this
issue and to potentially save our planet."3 Unfortunately, they have
not done so.14 Part of the blame for this failure, however, rests
with the Supreme Court. 5 Increasingly by tightening environmental standing requirements, the Court is permitting agency action
that harms the environment to continue unchecked. 6
This Comment examines the Court's difficulty with applying
the injury in fact element of the standing test as construed in Defenders of Wildlife and National Wildlife Federationto large scale environmental injuries. The Court's current construction of this
requirement is inappropriate in the environmental context.1 7 Part
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America.").
13 See SENATOR AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT
366 (1992) (theorizing that through greater individual awareness, education, political
activity, and personal responsibility, we can begin to solve the environmental
problems we face today).
14 John Balzar, Northwest Is at War with Itself, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1990 at Al (quotation omitted) (lamenting that "'[w]e, the richest nation in the world, are going to tell
the dirt poor people of Brazil and Indonesia and Zaire to be good environmentalists?
Ha. We're showing them how. In Amazonia, ancient rain forests are falling 1% a
year. We're cutting ours at 3% a year.'"). One author has deemed United States
progress toward greater environmental quality "embarrassing." Barry Commoner,
Failureof the EnvironmentalEffort, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10195, 10195 (June
1988). Professor Commoner described the improvement in the United States's environmental quality as "slight" in some cases and worse in others. Id. Further, the Professor claimed that the government's inability to solve the problem stems from the
fact that legislation only deals with the effects of pollution, rather than the causes of
pollution. Id. at 10196. Professor Commoner concluded that shifting emphasis from
palliative measures to preventative measures is the only way to improve environmental
quality. Id.
15 See infra notes 115-216 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations the
Court has placed upon environmental plaintiffs under its position on the standing
doctrine).
16 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992) (asserting that a
plaintiff, who raises a general grievance and seeks relief that benefits the plaintiff no
more than it benefits the general public, fails to meet Article III's standing requirements); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (holding that the
National Wildlife Federation did not demonstrate that its members were "'adversely
affected or aggrieved' by government action" by simply averring that a single member
used an unspecified portion of a large tract of land); see also Michael J. Shinn, Note,
Misusing ProceduralDevices to Dismiss an EnvironmentalLawsuit: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 66 WASH. L. REv. 893, 893, 908 (1991) (demonstrating that the
Supreme Court's holding in National Wildlife Fed'n ignores precedent and concluding
that the result promotes undesirable policy goals because agencies can use the decision to selectively disregard laws and insulate their decisions from judicial review).
17 See infra notes 213-216 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court's decisions
regarding standing where environmental plaintiff's are concerned).
Legislators have noted the importance of protecting the Earth's plants and animals and the habitats in which they live. See, e.g.,
119 CONG. REC. 30,162 (1973) (state-
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I of this Comment explains the importance of large environmental
ecosystems and the function of the citizen suit as a part of current
congressional attempts to protect them. The role of the Supreme
Court's construction of the injury in fact requirement in the government's failure to adequately protect the citizenry's environmental interests is scrutinized in Part II. Part III probes the future of
environmental litigation before the Court, concentrating on the effect of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's recent appointment to the
Supreme Court. Finally, this Comment concludes that the judiciary's interpretation of the injury in fact element of standing must
reflect scientific understanding with respect to the fundamental
nature of our environment. The Court must assimilate this understanding into the injury in fact requirement to eliminate the procedural impediments that constrain judicial review of agency action
in the environmental arena, and Justice Ginsberg should facilitate
this result.
I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Scientists define
riety and variability
complexes in which
cies is the integrity

biological diversity, or biodiversity, as "the vaamong living organisms and the ecological
they occur."1 8 Key to the survival of any speof the habitat in which it exists.' 9 History

ment of Rep. Sullivan) ("[E] ndangered species of plants and animals possess genetic
characteristics which cannot be replaced or artificially reproduced .... When we
threaten endangered species, we tinker with our own futures. We run risks whose
magnitude we understand dimly, if at all.")
Some scientists argue that endangered species must be preserved in order to
maintain biological diversity and ecological value. Mark Sagoff, On the Preservationof
Species, 7 COLUM.J. ENvmL. L. 33, 59 (1980). Biological diversity is essential because it
contributes to the stability of ecological systems, maintains a balance in nature, and
promotes the resiliency of ecosystems. Id. (citations omitted). Ecosystems with
higher degrees of genetic variation are better equipped to deal with environmental
stress. Id. (citation omitted). Further, diverse ecosystems and endangered species
have intrinsic, aesthetic, and metaphysical worth. Id.
18 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRES, COMBINED SUMMARIES:
TECHNOLOGIES TO SUSTAIN TROPICAL FOREST RESOURCES AND BIOLOGICAL DIvERSrTY 59

(1992). The term "biological resources" describes genes, wildlife, and ecosystems and
their importance to humans. Breckenridge, supra note 10, at 740 (citation omitted).
These resources provide medicine, food, and industrial products to humans. Id. Diversity of biological resources form the backbone of"environmental services." Id. For
example, the trees found within forest ecosystems remove carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere and produce oxygen, lowering the concentration of greenhouse gases.
Id. (citations omitted).
19 128 CONG. REC. 26,189 (1982) (statement of Rep. Evans) ("[I]t is important to
understand that the contribution of wild species to the welfare of mankind in agriculture, medicine, industry, and science have been of incalculable value. These contributions will continue only if we protect our storehouse of biological diversity. ...

1994]

COMMENT

abounds with examples of human beings preserving natural habitats to promote the continued viability of the Earth's plant and
animal species.2 0 Unfortunately, the increased ability of humans to
destroy the environment has created the necessity for larger scale
solutions now that problems reach beyond the borders of any one
city, state, country, or even continent.2 "
We humans must protect biodiversity because it is essential for
our continued healthy existence.22 Thus, the value of biodiversity
is "incalculable."2 3 Equally important in value are the healing characteristics apparent in species found in our rapidly disappearing
rain forests and elsewhere in the natural world. 24 There is little
[Olur wild plants and animals are not only uplifting to the human spirit, but they are
absolutely essential-as a practical matter-to our continued healthy existence.").
20 See Exodus 34:21 ("For six days you shall work, but on the seventh day you shall
cease work. ..

.");

Exodus 23:10-11 ("For six years you may sow your land and gather

its produce; but in the seventh year you shall let it lie fallow and leave it alone. It shall
provide food for .

.

. your people . . . what they laeve the wild animals may eat.");

Leviticus 25:6-7 (" [W] hat the land itself produces... shall be food for you... [and] for
your cattle and for the wild animals in your country."). In ancient times, the Hebrews
obeyed the law of Sabbatical, contained within the Old Testament, which required
that they rotate crops and leave farmland unsown every seventh year to allow the
nutrients to replenish within the soil. See Exodus 23:10-11. More than 2000 years ago,
a king of India set aside certain tracts of forest land to protect wildlife. LEE DURELL,
STATE OF THE ARK 78 (1986). The Roman Emperor Hadrian sought to preserve the
cedar forests of Lebanon, and European royalty in the Middle Ages placed large forests off limits to the general population Id.
21 Id. at 82.
22 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of
Respondents at 6, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 901424). The success of the human species can be attributed in part to its ability to
make productive use of numerous other species. William M. Flevares, Ecosystems, Economics, and Ethics: ProtectingBiological Diversity at Home and Abroad, 65 S. CAL. L. RtV.
2039, 2042 (1992). The threat to biodiversity arises from the short-sighted use of
those resources. Id. For example, the New York Times reported that a number of
species of fish found off coastal waters, including swordfish, atlantic salmon, Pacific
Ocean perch, mackerel, California halibut, shad, flounder, cod, and haddock, were
all in danger of being depleted. Fishing and Pollution Imperil CoastalFish, Several Studies
Find, N.Y. TIMESJuly 16, 1991, at C4. Scientists have attributed this depletion to both
increased water pollution as well as to overfishing. Id. Furthermore, the experts
noted that the effects upon the marine ecosystems from the depletion of fish at the
top of the food chain could not be accurately assessed. Id.
23 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of
Respondents at 8, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 901424).
24 See OFFicE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 60.
The Supreme Court has recognized the important contribution of certain plant species to medical science. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978)
(quotation omitted). In Tennessee Valley Authority v. HilA a controversial case decided
under the Endangered Species Act, the Supreme Court noted that oral contraceptives
were developed from a chemical extraction from a common plant. Id. (quotation
omitted).
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reason to believe that scientists will not find the key to curing many
of the ailments that continue to baffle the medical community in
nature. 25 Additionally, most people enjoy fishing, swimming, sailing, hiking, and countless other activities that involve interaction
with nature. 2 6 These activities have recreational and aesthetic values that only exist in undisturbed nature. 27 Thus, there are a myriad ofjustifications for treating the environment with intelligence.
Due to the vast scale of our planet's ecosystems, however, the
responsibility to prevent the loss of biodiversity cannot be effectively placed in the hands of any individual person or even government, as ecosystems know no political boundaries.2 8 It is not
possible to fence off a small section of land and expect to effectively protect it from outside environmental influences. 29 As a result, the sheer enormity of the injury to both human and non25 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of
Respondents at 8 n.9, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 901424) (quotation and citations omitted).
26 Flevares, supra note 22, at 2044.
27 See id. at 2044-46 (citations omitted) (discussing the non-economic values of a
healthy environment).
28 Brief of Amici Curiae Ecotropica Foundation of Brazil, et. al. in Support of Respondents at 7, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 90-1424)
(quotation omitted). For example, one's neighbor's dandelions will probably spawn
dandelions on one's own lawn, regardless of what kind of fence one builds.
Scholars often examine the problem of governmental responsibility for environmental protection through the lens of the public trust doctrine. See generallyJoseph L.

Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68
MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970) (discussing the concept and use of the public trust
doctrine).
29 See, Comment, ProtectingNationalParksfrom Developments Beyond Their Borders, 132
U. PENN. L. REv. 1189, 1190-91 (1984). Federal case law supports the notion that the
protection of one area of land requires the protection of the land surrounding it. See,
e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 538 (1976). In Kleppe, the Court embraced
the proposition that to protect the resources of the federal park land in question, it
was necessary to regulate the surrounding land. Id. at 538 (citation omitted).
The Kleppe Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses
and Burros Act. Id. at 546. That Act was passed to protect "all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States" from "capture,
branding, harassment, or death." See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1988).
The controversy in Kleppe arose after a local rancher contacted the New Mexico
Livestock Board, complaining that several burros were interfering with his cattle.
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 532-33. Once the burros were captured and sold, the Secretary of
the Interior, pursuant to the Act, sought to have the Livestock Board recover and
return the burros. Id. at 533-34. In response, New Mexico brought suit, claiming that
the Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 534 & n.4.
In a sweeping opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Property Clause of the
Constitution empowers Congress to safeguard the environment. Id. at 546. The
Property Clause of the Constitution states: "The Congress shall have the Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States. ... " U.S. CONsT. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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human interests that results from large scale damage to the environment, such as the loss of biodiversity, prevents the judicial
30
branch from quantifying the problem in legal terms.
The legislature has acted to safeguard our domestic and global
environment.3 1 Recognizing the urgency and importance of regulating the citizenry's interaction with the environment, Congress
enacted the Clean Air Act,3 2 Clean Water Act, 3 Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,3 4 Na3
35
tional Environmental Policy Act, and Endangered Species Act.

6

30 See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of a
healthy environment and the difficulty of effectively addressing environmental
problems).
31 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a) (4) (1988) (declaring Congress's intent to protect endangered species worldwide).
76
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 740171q (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (Clean Air Act). The Clean
Air Act establishes the general outline for federal control over and regulation of air
pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). The Act sets deadlines for
the EPA to promulgate national ambient air quality standards to be implemented by
the states, "national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants," and auto emissions standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7412, 7521 (1988). The Act also authorizes
citizen suits. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
33 Water Pollution Prevention and Control, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1993) (Clean Water Act). The Clean Water Act bans the unpermitted discharge of
pollutants, requires technology-based controls on discharges, and establishes a national permit program, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES). 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1311(b), 1342(a) (1988). The Act also authorizes
citizen suits. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988). Also, the statute seeks to make waters fishable and swimmable "wherever attainable." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2) (1988).
34 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)) (CERCLA). CERCLA is essentially a comprehensive liability scheme rather than a regulatory scheme. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (1988). CERCLA established liability for the release of hazardous substances
and created a "Superfund" to finance efforts to clean up such releases. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607(a), 9611 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
The statute defined four classes of parties that are potentially liable for clean-up
costs incurred in a CERCLA cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988). The four
classes of parties that are potentially liable are: (1) current owners and operators of
facilities where hazardous substances are released or threatened to be released; (2)
owners and operators of facilities at the time substances were disposed; (3) persons
who arranged for transportation, disposal, or treatment of such substances; and (4)
persons who accepted such substances for transport, disposal, or treatment. Id.
These parties are strictly liable for: (1) all costs of remedial action or removal incurred by the federal government consistent with the National Contingency Plan; (2)
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any person consistent with the National Contingency Plan; (3) damages for injury to natural resources; and (4) costs of
health assessments. Id.
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (NEPA). NEPA established
broad national environmental policy goals. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988). Primarily,
the Act required federal agencies to assess the environmental impact of contemplated
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). NEPA established "the continuing policy of the

Federal Government ...

to use all practicable means and measures ...

to create and

maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,
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These statutes are a product of a "remarkable burst of legislative
activity" in the early 1970s.17 The impetus for this "burst" is widely
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans." 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) (1988). Section 4332(C) requires that all
federal agencies
[I]nclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)-(v) (1988).
36 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (ESA). ESA seeks to promote
federal action that conserves species in danger of extinction and prohibits the taking
of any such species by any person. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1538 (1988). ESA seeks
preserve the species' "esthetic [sic], ecological, educational, historical, recreational
and scientific value." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1988). ESA protects species that are
listed by the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior as either "endangered species" or "threatened species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988). Endangered species
include "any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range .

. . ."

16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988).

Threatened species include

.any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20)
(1988). Once a species is listed as endangered, the sale, import, export, and transport
of that species are prohibited. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (A), (A)(1)(D) (1988).
The ESA requires federal agencies to consult with the Department of the Interior
to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ...is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species
which is determined by the Secretary... to be critical. . .

."

Endangered Species Act,

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1988). After consultation with an affected agency, the Secretary is required to issue a biological opinion of the effects the proposed agency action
might have on listed endangered species, and propose an acceptable alternative plan
if the intended action is found to jeopardize those species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3)
(1988).
37 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:

LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY 103 (1992). As Percival points out, however, environmental regulation has a
long history, as well as strong common law roots in private and public nuisance law.
Id. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMEIwcAN LAW (1985) (setting

forth the historical background of the American legal system); Joel F. Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974) (discussing the
minimal effects of nuisance law upon industrialization during the period of the Industrial Revolution). For an example of an early environmental case decided under nuisance law, see Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 659,
667 (Tenn. 1904) (allowing a claim for monetary damages but refusing to close a
copper smelter due to the odors emitted from it).
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attributed to the federal government's increased interest in environmental protection that followed a series of disasters,"8 public
demonstrations, 9 and books40 that focused the public's attention
and stirred politicians to action. 4 '
Congress has sought the aid of the citizenry as private attorney
generals to ensure compliance with enacted statutes.4 2 To that
end, most environmental statutes today employ the citizen suit as
an enforcement mechanism." 3 Citizen suits are actions brought by
citizens against governmental agencies and those who violate environmental statutes.4" Generally, citizen suit provisions authorize
two types of suits: (1) suits to force an agency to take non-discre38 See PERCIVAL, supra note 37, at 2. The 1969 oil spill in Santa Barbara, the Exxon
Valdez oil spill, the Chernobyl reactor explosion, and the Union Carbide plant explosion in Bhopal, India are widely credited with spurring environmental legislation and
raising public consciousness. Id. In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA (Superfund) in
response to the environmental disaster at Love Canal. Not So Super Superfund, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at A16. The Hooker Chemical Company filled the Love Canal
with 20,000 tons of toxic chemicals. Id. These chemicals were believed to be responsible for the high rates of cancer, miscarriages, and birth defects encountered in the
vicinity of the canal. Id.
39 See PERCIVAL, supra note 37, at 4. The devastating oil spill in the Santa Barbara
channel and the media's coverage of the disaster enhanced participation in the first
Earth Day, held on April 22, 1970. Id.
40 See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (exposing the highly toxic nature of the pesticide DDT).
41 See PERCVAL, supra note 37, at 4.
42 Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of EnvironmentalLaw, 65 TUL. L. REv.
339, 339, 340 (1990) (citations omitted).
43 Id. at 340 (citing Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)
(1988)) (other citations omitted); see 16 U.S.C. § 154 0(g)(1) (1988) (setting forth the
citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act); 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1988)
(allowing for citizen suits under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (1988) (providing for private persons to bring civil
suits under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1515(a) (1988) (permitting citizens to seek equitable relief under the Deepwater
Port Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (1988) (setting forth the citizen suit provisions of the
Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (a) (1988) (allowing citizen's to bring suit
under the Noise Control Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988) (providing private citizens
with the authority to bring civil actions under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (authorizing citizen suits under
the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1988) (permitting citizens to seek relief
under CERCLA); 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1988) (setting forth the citizen suit provisions
of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act).
The Clean Water Act simply permits suits by "any citizen." Greve, supra note 42,
at 340 n.5 (citing The Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C § 1365 (1988)). Under the
Clean Water Act, the term "citizen" is defined as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." Id. (citing Clean Water Act § 505(g), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), 13 6 5(g) (1988)). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act is the only significant federal environmental statute that lacks provisions for
citizen suits. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 3136(g) (1988)).
44 PERCIVAL, supra note 37, at 192.
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tionary action and, (2) suits to force people or organizations to
comply with environmental statutes.4 5 Statutes allowing citizen
suits against government agencies are patterned on the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Air Act, which authorizes "any person" to
sue the Environmental Protection Agency administrator "where
there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or
duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator."46 Further, the statute defines "person" as including individuals, corporations, partnerships, municipalities, and agents of
the United States.4 7 This kind of suit is particularly useful in the
enforcement of statutory deadlines created by Congress and
missed by the EPA.4 8
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) made significant use of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act against
private parties who violated the statute in the early 1980s, when
government enforcement of environmental statutes under the first
Reagan administration declined dramatically. 49 The NRDC examined the discharge monitoring reports (DMRs), which all dischargers are required to file and which are open to the public
under the Act." The NRDC then systematically analyzed the
DMRs as prima facie evidence of Clean Water Act violations,
45 Id. The federal judiciary promoted the efficacy of these provisions through an
increased willingness to open the court system for judicial review of agency decisions
affecting the environment. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972). In
the landmark case of Sierra Club, the Supreme Court recognized that aesthetic, conservational, and recreational interests may be sufficient to establish injury in fact for
purposes of standing. Id. (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)).
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1988).
47 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1988).
48 PERCIVAL, supra note 37, at 667.
Created in 1970 by executive order, the EPA serves the following principle
functions:
-The establishment and enforcement of environmental protection standards consistent with national environmental goals.
-The conduct of research on the adverse effects of pollution and on
methods and equipment for controlling it, the gathering of information
on pollution, and the use of this information in strengthening environmental protection programs and recommending policy changes.
-Assisting others, through grants, technical assistance and other means,
in arresting pollution of the environment.
-Assisting the Council on Environmental Quality in Developing and recommending to the President new policies for the protection of the
environment.
42 U.S.C. app. § 4321 (1988).
49 PERCIVAL, supra note 37, at 996.

50 Id.
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mailed 60-day notice letters to parties in violation, and followed
with suits to force compliance. 5 1 These types of suits are valuable
because they act as a venue for public, democratic participation in
efforts to redress environmental pollution.52
II.

THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE
CITIZENRY'S ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS

A.

The Standing Requirement

Congress has granted the federal courts the power to judicially
review administrative actions taken under many of the federal environmental statutes.5 Also, the citizen suit provisions of most of
these statutes grant jurisdiction to the appropriate federal district
courts.5 4 Therefore, many environmental disputes surrounding
the implementation of federal environmental statutes come before
the Supreme Court on appeal.5 5 In the context of environmental
law, however, constitutional standing dictates the effectiveness of
51 Id.
52 Greve, supra note 42, at 340 (citations omitted)
53 See 7 U.S.C. § 136n(a) (1988) (providing that the federal district courts have
jurisdiction to review administrative actions under the Federal Pesticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a) (1988) (stating that petitions for judicial
review under the Toxic Substances Control Act must be filed with the federal courts
of appeals); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) (1988) (granting the federal circuit courts jurisdiction to review administrative actions under the Endangered Species Act); 30 U.S.C.

§ 1276(a) (1988) (providing that the federal district courts have the authority to review actions under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b) (1988) (stating that the federal courts of appeals have the authority to review administrative actions under the Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300-j(7) (1988) (permitting
the federal courts of appeals to judicially review actions taken by the administrator
under the Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a) (granting the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia the authority to judicially review administrative actions under the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(a) (1988) (providing that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has the authority to review administratve actions under CERCLA).
54 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(c) (1988) (granting the federal district courts jurisdiction
over actions that arise under the Endangered Species Act); Safe Drinking Water Act,
42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (1988) (stating that citizen suits commenced under the Safe
Drinking Water Act are to be heard by the federal district courts); 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (a)
(1988) (asserting that the federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits
commenced under the Noise Control Act); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988) (granting the federal district courts the authority to adjudicate citizen suits under the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (1988) (authorizing the federal district courts to hear citizen suits under the
Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b) (1988) (permitting the federal district courts to
hear cases brought by citizens under CERCLA).
55 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (asserting that most litigation
under the federal environmental statutes occurs in the federal courts).
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these statutes.5 6
Article III of the Constitution governs standing through its
"case or controversy" requirement.5 7 In its most basic form, this
test involves a determination of whether the court is empowered to
resolve the disputed issue. 58 The goal of the early standing doctrine was to insure that the parties before the court were truly adversarial and had personal stakes in the outcome.5 9 Today,
however, answering the question of what constitutes a case or controversy is anything but a basic task.60
The Supreme Court controls which cases it may hear by examining the plaintiffs claims in light of Article III's requirement as
well as in light of court-imposed "prudential" considerations.6"
Plaintiffs ostensibly meet the standing requirements by satisfying a
three-pronged test. 2 The constitutional component requires that
56 See infra notes 106-114 (discussing how the doctrine of standing presents difficulties in the adjudication of cases under the environmental statutes).
57 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl.1. See supra note 2 for the text of the Clause.
58 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) ("[I]n essence the question of
standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues.")
59 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the appellants alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the
question of standing."); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Ananlysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645, 679-81 (1973) (citations omitted) (discussing how
representativeness may pose problems where standing is concerned).
60 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (noting that the less-concrete nature
of environmental injuries may discourage courts from hearing cases brought by environmental groups on behalf of their members).
The history of the standing doctrine is beyond the scope of this Comment. Extant histories include Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969) and Louis L.Jaffe, Standing to SecureJudicial
Review: PrivateActions, 75 HARV. L. REv. 255 (1961). Despite the sheer enormity of
case law and scholarship devoted to the single issue of standing, the guidance provided by the Supreme Court as to its seemingly clear analytical framework has been
"less than pellucid." Dellums v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d
968, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
61 4 KENNETH CuLP DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 24:5 (2d ed. 1983) (stating that the constitutional and prudential requirements of standing complicate the
standing issue); see also, JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTrI. THE COMING OF AGE OF PuLIC LAw 34-54 (1978) (surveying standing's conceptual doctrinal development). See
infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of prudential limitations
upon standing.
62 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Simon v. Eatern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)) ("[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. II requires the party
...

to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury' ... that
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a potential plaintiff demonstrate: (1) an "injury in fact"6 or "distinct and palpable" injury64 which (2) "'fairly can be traced to the
challenged actiori"'6566 and (3) "'is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.'

The Supreme Court uses the phrase "injury in fact" to describe
the kind of injury, caused by the defendant and redressable by the
courts, that meets the constitutional prerequisites for standing.6 7
The precise meaning of the phrase continues to elude definition.6 8
Currently, the Court focuses on the cognizability of the plaintiff's
injury and the concrete and immediate character of the harm.6 9
The concept of cognizability relates to whether some factor
common to all plaintiffs defines or limits an injury.7 ° In Sierra Club
v. Morton,7 1 the Court clearly defined the type of cognizable injury
the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision.'").
For the purposes of this Comment, only the "injury in fact" element is relevant,
and discussion of the other elements is therefore limited. "Redressibility" and "traceability" are the final prongs of the standing test. See id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38,
41). Traceability requires that the plaintiff's injury be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's action or inaction. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
(1973) (footnote and citations omitted). When the defendant named in the suit is
not responsible for the claimed injury, there is no Article III case or controversy.
Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42. The redressibility element requires that the injury be "likely
... redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 38.
63 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)
("The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact .... ); see also Valley Forge,.454 U.S. at 472 (articulating that
the standing requirement "assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact"); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261 ("The plaintiff must
show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant.").
64 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975))).
65 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41); see also Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 261 (citations omitted) ("[T]he complaint must indicate that the
injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions.").
66 See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
67 See id. at 473.
68 Kurt S. Kusiak, Note, Standing to Sue: A Brief Review of Current Standing Doctrine,
71 B.U. L. REv. 667, 670 (1991) (noting that early case law interpretations of Article
III provide only basic guidelines for resolving current standing questions and recommending that federal judges rely on the Article's underlying principles to reach standing determinations).
69 Id. at 670-71.
70 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegrationof Article Ill, 74 CAL. L. REv.
1915, 1929-30 (1986) ("The question 'Are you injured?' folds itself within two inquiries. Is the interest asserted actually injured? And, is the interest asserted, if injured,
one of which the court will take cognizance?").
71 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Standing applies both to individual plaintiffs as well as
organizations suing on behalf of their members. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
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that would satisfy the standing requirement. 72 The Sierra Club
sought to restrain federal officials from approving a development
plan for a ski resort adjacent to the Sequoia National Forest.73 The
Sierra Club claimed that it would be injured by the adverse effects
that this Walt Disney Enterprises plan would have on the environment.74 The Sierra Club never pleaded that its members ever used
or planned to use the land. 75 The Supreme Court affirmed the
failed to allege
Ninth Circuit's determination that the Sierra Club
76
sufficient injury, and thus denied them standing.
490, 511 (1975) (citations omitted) ("[I]n attempting to secure relief from injury to
itself, an association may assert the rights of its members . . . ."); see also Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (setting the
standard for organizations suing on their members' behalf).
72 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35 ("[T]he 'injury in fact' test requires no more
than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be...
among the injured.").
The Court in Sierra Club referred to language in Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations, Inc. v. Camp that outlined acceptable types of injury. Id. at 738
(quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970)). In Data Processing,the owner of a business that sold data processing services
brought an action against the Comptroller of Currency and a national bank, challenging a ruling promulgated by the Comptroller that allowed national banks to provide
data processing services. DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 151. The Supreme Court applied
a two-part standing test, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate an injury in fact that
fell within the zone of protection afforded by the statute upon which the suit was
premised. Id. at 152, 153. Discussing the types of injury that were sufficient to satisfy
this test, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, explained that injury in fact can be
demonstrated by non-economic loss as well as by financial loss. Id. at 154. In addition, Justice Douglas stated that the plaintiffs "interest, at times, may reflect 'aes-

thetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic values." Id. (quotation
and citation omitted).
73 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 729-30. Sierra Club sought to prevent Walt Disney Enterprises from converting Mineral King Valley, an undeveloped recreation area, into a
ski resort. Id. at 728, 729-30. Disney's development plan encompassed 80 acres of
land and received approval by the Forest Service in the winter of 1969. Id. at 729.

Disney's plans for the resort included a multi-million dollar complex of motels, parking lots, swimming pools, and other facilities intended to accommodate 14,000 customers per day. Id. Additionally, Disney intended to construct ski lifts, ski trails, and
other facilities required to turn the mountain into an area suitable for skiing. Id. The

plan also included the construction of high-voltage lines and a twenty-mile highway to
be provided by the state of California. Id.
74 Id. at 734.
75 Id. at 735. The Sierra Club brought suit "as a membership corporation with 'a
special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks,
games refuges and forests of the country.'" Id. at 730. Although the district court
granted Sierra Club a preliminary injunction against the Walt Disney construction,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, maintaining that there was "no allegation in the complaint
that members of the Sierra Club would be affected by the actions of [the respondents]
other than the fact that the actions are personally displeasing or distasteful to them."
Id. at 731 (citation and quotation omitted) (alteration in original).
76 Id. at 731, 741 (citation omitted).
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Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart posited that the destruction of the natural beauty of the land could satisfy the requirement of injury in fact." The Justice then declared that the size of
the group claiming injury had no bearing on its ability to obtain
judicial review. 78 However, Justice Stewart maintained, "the party
seeking review [must] be himself among the injured," and the underlying injury would be accredited only to those who actually use
the lands at issue. 79 The Court implied, nonetheless, that the Sierra Club could achieve standing if its complaint had been
amended to include allegations that their personal use and enjoyment of the land was adversely affected by the proposed
development.8 0
In dissent, Justice Douglas sharply criticized the requirement
of individual injury."1 Advocating the creation of a legal fiction to
allow the environment to sue for its own protection, much like a
corporation, Justice Douglas stated that the environment is an "inarticulate member of the ecological group [that] cannot speak." 2
Because the environment is an inanimate object and because federal agencies are often controlled by powerful interests, the Justice
concluded, the environment must be granted the ability to bring
83
suit on its own behalf.
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the current
procedural concepts of standing as rigid, inflexible, and inadequate to manage the new issues that accompany environmental litigation." Justice Blackmun favored granting certain groups
standing to bring suit on behalf of the environment where those
groups have a "provable, sincere, dedicated and established status"
and are "pertinent, bona fide and well-recognized" in the environmental arena. 5
One year later, in United States v. Students ChallengingRegulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP),86 the Supreme Court expanded upon
77 Id. at 734.
78

Id.

79 Id. at 735.

80 Id. at 735, 736 (footnote omitted).
81 See id. at 751-52 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 742-43, 752 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
83 Id. at 745-46, 749 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 755-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 757-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86 412 U.S. 669 (1973). In SCRAP, five law students challenged the Interstate
Commerce Commission's (ICC) proposed surcharge on freight rates. Id. at 674, 678.
Most of the railroad companies in the United States had requested the 2.5%
surcharge on freight rates to meet "increasing costs and severely inadequate revenues." Id. at 674. The students alleged that the ICC failed to prepare an environmen-
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its holding in Sierra Club, reaching its most liberal definition of the
Article III injury requirement, .87 The SCRAP Court held that
harm to economic, recreational, and aesthetic interests was sufficient to constitute injury in fact, declaring that an "identifiable trifle" would satisfy the requirement.8 8 Thus, the Court asserted,
plaintiffs should not be denied standing simply because they allege
an injury only to the use and enjoyment of the environment.8 9
In both Sierra Club and SCRAP, the claimed injury was the retal impact statement, as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires, to
examine the effects of the rate hike. Id. at 679 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C)
(1988)); see supra note 35 (describing the NEPA). Central to the students' claim of
injury was the theory that the higher rate would discourage the use of recyclable
materials and encourage the use of new raw materials because of increased transportation costs. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 685. Further, alleged SCRAP, the surcharge would
result in higher prices for finished products and the destruction of natural resources
such as forests, streams, and rivers. Id. at 678. Finally, the SCRAP members alleged
that they used the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area for its forests and streams and
that their use of these natural resources was adversely affected by the surcharge. Id.
87 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATrVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-2
(1976) (describing SCRAP as "an all-time high in Supreme Court liberality on the
subject of standing.");
A number of lower court cases also reflect this liberal view of the standing doctrine where environmental issues are concerned. See Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1096-97, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating that the health
risk from DDT is sufficient injury for standing in an action challenging Secretary of
Agriculture's failure to restrict its use); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 615, 616 (2d. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966) (citation omitted) (holding that the effects of a hydroelectric power project upon aesthetic and recreational interests were sufficient to demonstrate standing
without a showing of economic injury); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1212,
1217 (D. Colo. 1970) (declaring that property owners in vicinity of proposed atomic
blast site were adversely affected by the actions of the Atomic Energy Commission,
and therefore had standing to sue).
88 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686-87, 689 n.14 (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 613 (1968)) (other citation omitted).
89 Id. at 686-87. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart rejected the government's
argument that, under the Sierra Club Court's analysis, the students lacked standing
because their claims were unsubstantiated, vague, and insufficient. Id. at 683-84, 685.
The Court distinguished Sierra Club on the grounds that SCRAP had appropriately
alleged in its pleadings that the action complained of would adversely impact lands
used by the organization's members. Id. at 687 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 735 (1972)). Justice Stewart explained that "aesthetic and environmental wellbeing, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our
society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many
rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through
the judicial process." Id. at 686 (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734). Expanding
upon the notion that the large number of injured plaintiffs should not deter their
ability to bring suit, Justice Stewart stated that if the courts denied standing where
many people were injured, then the "most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody." Id. at 686, 688.
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sult of an extended chain of causation." The Court resolved these
cases differently, however, because, where SCRAP alleged specific
allegations of a palpable injury,9 the Sierra Club's complaint reflected more of a "mere interest in the problem."9 2 These cases
represent an expansion of the standing doctrine that enabled environmental law to undergo a marked transformation over the past
twenty years.9"
Additionally, both Sierra Club and SCRAP enhanced the ability
of environmental organizations to bring suit against administrative
agencies on their members' behalf.9 4 Most importantly, for the
first time, the Supreme Court recognized that harm to the enjoyment of the aesthetic quality of land and to ecological values are
sufficient injuries upon which to base standing, even though they
are not economic in nature.9 5 The reason may be that the Court
chose to associate the injuries in these cases with traditional personal injuries rather than to recognize them as innovative environmental injuries.9 6
As a second facet of the standing doctrine's injury in fact analysis, the Supreme Court also requires that the injury be "actual or
imminent, not 'conjectural or hypothetical."' 9 7 The aim of this
90 Id. at 688 (stating that the injury alleged in SCRAP was "far less direct and perceptible" than that alleged in Sierra Club, and asserting that the court in SCRAP was
required to follow a "more attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury").
91 See id at 687.
92 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739. In SCRAPJustice Stewart stated that the "pleadings
must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable."
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688. The Court held that the plaintiff must at minimum allege
that he has been harmed or is in immediate danger of being harmed by an agency
action, and not simply that he can "imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency's action." Id. at 688-89.
93 See BillJ. Hays, Comment, Standing and EnvironmentalLaw: JudicialPolicy and the
Impact ofLujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 39 KAN. L. R~v. 997, 999 (1991) (citation omitted) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton... opened a
new era in the federal courts by allowing an environmental organization to challenge
a proposed development on federal land on behalf of its members.").
94

Id.

95 Id. at 999-1000 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738) (explaining that access to the
federal courts is increased for environmental plaintiffs because the Supreme Court
"recognized aesthetic and recreational interests as sufficient to meet [A]rticle III's requirement of injury in fact, so long as actual use of the threatened lands was
alleged").
96 Interview with Professor Marc R. Poirier, Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall
University School of Law, in Newark, N.J. (Mar. 22, 1994).
97 SeeWhitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Supreme Court
denied standing to an individual who alleged that the police stopped him for a minor
traffic violation and placed him in a chokehold until he was unconscious. Lyons, 461
U.S. at 97-98, 113. The victim sued the City of Los Angeles to enjoin future use of the
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prong of the inquiry is not to measure the seriousness or degree of
unconscionability of the alleged injury.9" Rather, the Supreme
Court seeks to ensure that injury has occurred or that the plaintiffs
are threatened by potential future injury at the hands of the defendants.9 9 The result is consistent with the overall aim of the
standing doctrine, which is to sharpen controversies and demarcate the separate branches of government. 0 °
The Supreme Court also examines cases for standing through
a non-constitutional lens, exercising what are commonly referred
to as prudential concerns.1 0 1 The three main limitations of prudential consideration provide a self-imposed restraint on the
chokehold technique by the police force, claiming that it was unnecessarily dangerous. Id. at 98. The Court denied standing, reasoning that "the injury or threat of
injury must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'hypothetical' or 'conjectural.'" Id. at
102, 110, 113 (quotations omitted). The majority stated that:
[i]n order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would
have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with
the police but also to make the incredible assertion either (1) that all
police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they
happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing
a citation, or for questioning, or (2) that the City ordered or authorized
police officers to act in such manner.
Id. at 105-06. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens,
dissented and found that the city had implicitly authorized the chokehold. Id. at 11314 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
98 Kusiak, supra note 68, at 673 (explaining that "[iut is not the seriousness or unconscionability of the injury that is important").
99 Id. (asserting that "it is the potential for future injury to the plaintiff from the
named defendants that should guide the inquiry").
100 Id. at 673-74 (noting that in SCRAP, Sierra Club, and Lyons, the Court recognized
that Article III limitations prevented it from resolving disputes that did not involve
'relatively concrete disputes between discernable parties" and that solving general societal problems was a responsibility best left to the legislature).
101 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citation omitted). In essence, prudential concerns involve determining whether the proper functions of the courts are
fulfilled by hearing a case. Id. at 500 (citation omitted). They are generally consistent
with the underlying goal of the standing doctrine because they promote judicial restraint, deference to the legislature, and separation of powers. See id. (citation omitted) ("Without such limitations-closely relate to Art. III concerns but essentially
matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions .... ."); see also Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112) (alteration in original)
(opining that "[a]nimating this Court's holdings was the principle that '[a] federal
court.., is not the proper forum to press general complaints about the way in which
government goes about its business'"); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208,
220 (1974) (stating that "standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest...
which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily
abstract nature of the injury all citizens share").
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Supreme Court.1 0 2 First, the Court has generally required that the
interests of plaintiffs challenging an agency ruling or governmental
regulation fall within the "zone of interests" encompassed by the
statute at issue.'t ' Second, plaintiffs cannot assert generalized
grievances more appropriately handled by the legislature.1 0 4
Third, the rights, interests, or issues presented by a suit must be
those of the plaintiffs, not those of third parties.10 5
Environmental suits are often premised upon injuries recognized by statute.'0 6 The limits of Congress's power to create a statutory right, however, are not clear from the text of the
Constitution. 7 Article III vests federal judicial power in the
Supreme Court and any lower courts that Congress establishes, extending the power of these courts to cases that arise under congressional legislation."0 8 Further, the judicial power reaches all cases
102 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970) (citation omitted) (stating that the Court had resolved issues of standing by
exercising "rule [s]of self-restraint").
103 Id. at 153. Courts generally apply prudential limitations where no statute explicitly grants standing to the plaintiffs. Sarah A. Robichaud, Note, Lujan V. National
Wildlife Federation: The Supreme Court Tightens the Reins on Standingfor Environmental
Groups, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 443, 460 (1991) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court
applies the "zone of interests" test to determine the scope of implied or express statutory standing. See Data Processing,397 U.S. at 153 ("[T]he question [is] whether the
interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.").
The Supreme Court examined the ability of plaintiffs to challenge governmental
action in Data Processing. See id. at 151. This case marked the introduction of the
"zone of interests" test for statutory standing. See id. at 153. The Court considered
whether the plaintiff had demonstrated an "injury in fact," and stated that the injury
could be "economic or otherwise." Id. at 152.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) confers standing to persons "'aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant staute.'" Id. at 153-54 (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1964 & Supp. IV)). For a general discussion of standing under the APA,
see William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 255-64 (1988).
104 See CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 71 (4th ed.
1983).
105 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted).
106 See supra note 43 (listing the citizen suit provisions of the major environmental
statutes).
107 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 514 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3
(1973)) ("Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.... Congress
may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute"); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (WhiteJ, concurring) (noting that "with [the] statute purporting to give those who are authorized to complain to the agency the right to sue in
court, I would sustain the statute insofar as it extends standing to those in the position
of the petitioners .. ").
108 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2. See supra note 2 for the text of § 2.
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and controversies that arise under the Constitution, as well as those
that arise "under the laws of the United States." °9 Therefore, Congress has the power to control the scope of thejudiciary's power by
creating statutory rights.1"'
The debate in environmental litigation focuses on these statutory rights."1 1 Most litigation in the environmental field is premised upon statutes that create private rights of action, define
injuries, and delineate zones of interest so as to grant standing to
as large a group as possible."1 ' The Supreme Court, however, has
the ultimate power to interpret these statutes and the citizen suit
provisions set forth within them.'1 The result is that the Court still
has the opportunity to screen out often unwanted environmental
litigation, thereby making unwarranted policy decisions. 14
B.

The Devolution of Injury in Fact
The Supreme Court has recently begun to limit the effective-

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
110 See Dan Braveman, The Standing Doctrine: A Dialogue Between the Court and Congress, 2 CAgDozo L. REv. 31, 51 (1980) (arguing that Congress may legitimately conclude that a plaintiff need not show actual injury to meet Article III standing
requirements).
111 See, e.g., Hays, supra note 93, at 1000-01 (citations omitted) ("Express exclusion
of separation of powers questions from the threshold determination of who has standing.., acknowledges that the central issue.., involves the operation of government
according to the rule of law, and that it is the court's duty to 'say what the law is,' and
in so doing give effect to the will of Congress.") Congress created environmental
rights for the citizenry by providing for citizen suits in environmental statutes. See
supra note 43 (listing the citizen suit provisions of the major environmental statutes).
112 Hays, supra note 93, at 1000 (citations ommitted).
113 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
114 See id.; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2135, 2146 (1992) (using
the standing doctrine to deny Defenders of Wildlife from seeking relief under the
Endangered Species Act).
Until Defenders of Wildlife, the Court deferred to Congress with respect to standing
when it could discern congressional intent. See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1984) (holding that Congress intended to preclude consumers from seeking judicial review under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9, 109 (1979)) (holding that
Congress intended that standing under the Fair Housing Act be extended to the limits of Article III).
In his account of the history of the law of standing, Professor Cass Sunstein
demonstrated the extent to which the Defenders of Wildlife Court departed from this
philosophy. Sei generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries,"and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992). For other historical accounts of
the Court's position on the standing doctrine, see generally Berger, supra note 60;
Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363
(1972-73); Nichol, supra note 70; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988).
109
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ness of citizen suits by using standing as a shield to fend off environmental cases, thus frustrating congressional intent to promote
private enforcement of federal environmental laws.1 15 In the late
1960s and the early 1970s, the federal courts were receptive to citizen suit litigation arising from the environmental legislation enacted during that period."1 6 In the 1980s, however, the Supreme
Court led the federal courts in adopting a less favorable stance towards environmental litigation. 17 This occurred despite Congress's continued interest in protecting the environment,
apparently as part of a larger movement promoting judicial restraint. 1 8 Some commentators have suggested that the judiciary
may be using separation of powers to disguise judicial policy activism.1 19 Thus, "the institutional judicial restraint prompted by these
concerns . . . has the potential to raise separation of powers
problems similar to those that courts purporting to exercise institutional restraint are seeking to avoid."12
1.

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation

Two recent cases, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation12 1 and
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife22 , demonstrate the Court's struggle to
apply the injury in fact requirement in the environmental context. 123 The first, National Wildlife Federation,illustrates the Court's
misapplication of the injury in fact requirement to prevent the re115 See Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreatfrom JudicialActivism: The Seventh Circuit and
the Environment,63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 209, 209 (1987) ("By the 1980's, the courts, led
by the Supreme Court, were presenting a much lower profile in environmental cases,
even though Congress remained firmly committed to . . . environmental protection

initiatives .

. . .");

see, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2135, 2146 (using the

standing doctrine to deny Defenders of Wildlife from seeking relief under the Endangered Species Act).; Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (holding that the National Wildlife Federation did not meet the requirements for standing
under the relevant statutes by simply asserting that one of its members used an unspecified area of the vast tract of land at issue).
116 Glicksman, supra note 115, at 209. The federal courts initially reacted by lowering the procedural barriers to environmental lawsuits in order to promote the new
pro-environmental objectives of Congress. Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 209, 210. The trend toward judicial restraint continues today, driven by

concerns that the judiciary is not qualified to review the executive's implementation
of regulatory legislation. Id. at 210.
119 See, e.g., id. at 253.
120 Id. at 210.
121 497 U.S. 871 (1990).

112 S. Ct. 2131 (1992).
See supra notes 115-216 and accompanying text (illustrating how the Supreme
Court has found it difficult to apply the test of standing where the injuries alleged are
environmental in nature).
122
123
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view of an undeclared agency program. 124 National Wildlife Federation began as a challenge by the National Wildlife Federation
(NWF) 125 to a Department of the Interior land withdrawal review
program designed to reevaluate and reclassify land under federal
control. 126 The goal of NWF's suit was to force the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) to comply with the procedural requirements
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA) 127 and the National Environmental Protection Act of
124 See Shinn, supra note 16, at 905 (asserting that the National Wildlife Federation
Court misinterpreted the opinion of the court of appeals in finding that NWF's members did not contend that they used specific areas of land); see also E. Gates GarrityRokous, Note, PreservingReview of Undeclared Programs: A Statutory Redefinition of Final
Agency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643, 653 (1991) (contending that the Court's decision in
NWF gave federal agencies an effective tactic for avoiding judicial review).
125 The National Wildlife Federation is a non-profit, 4.5 million-member organization that works to protect natural resources and educate the public about the environment. John Treangen, Note, Standing: Closing the Doors ofJudicial Review, 36 S.D. L.
REv. 136, 138 (1991).
126 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 272-73 (D.D.C. 1985),
affd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In 1976, Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA). See id. at 272; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). The Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) enforces certain provisions of the FLPMA known as the
land withdrawal review program. See National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 877. Withdrawals act to withhold federal land from sale, settlement, location, or entry pursuant
to applicable federal natural resources laws. 43 U.S.C. §§ 17020) (1988). The land
withdrawal review program, however, was not an administrative program because the
BLM never issued an order or regulation to implement it. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497
U.S. at 890. The National Wildlife Federation merely used the name to describe
BLM's continual review of withdrawal revocation applications, which entailed categorizing lands as "public" and creating "land use plans." Id.
The BLM's goal during this period was to eliminate all unnecessary withdrawals,
thereby opening the maximum number of acres possible to mining and mineral leasing operations. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 309 (1987). Under
the FLPMA, the BLM removed protective restrictions from approximately 180 million
acres of federally-owned land in seventeen states. Id. at 307.
In 1985, the National Wildlife Federation brought suit against the BLM to challenge the land withdrawal review program and the revocation of protected status of
the undeveloped land. National Wildlife Fed'n, 676 F. Supp. at 272-73. The district
court initially granted National Wildlife Federation's request for a preliminary injunction against the program. Id. at 279. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the
district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction. National Wildlife Fed'n, 835 F.2d at
327.
127 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). Congress declared that "in
administering public land statutes and excercising discretionary authority granted by
them, the Secretary be required to establish comprehensive rules and regulations after considering the views of the general public.. . ." 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (5) (1988).
The FLPMA is an elaborate system of controls for reviewing past withdrawals and
classifying federal lands. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1988). Under the statute, the Secretary of the Interior can recommend removing protected status from federal land
where doing so is consistent with the purposes of the programs that had originally
classified the land as protected. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b) (1988). See generally, GEORGE
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1969 (NEPA). 28
To satisfy the injury in fact element of standing, NWF claimed
that its members used a particular area affected by the land withdrawal revocation program for recreation and aesthetic enjoyment. 129 NWF anticipated that the proposed mining and drilling
would destroy the wildlife habitat of the public lands, thus ruining
L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAw (1994)
(discussing public natural resources law from historical, constitutional, statutory, and
administrative perspectives).
The FLPMA requires the Secretary to process land withdrawl revocation proposals in order to effectuate the sale of federal land, to clear records where land slated
for withdrawal was engaged in a conflicting use, or to reestablish multiple use management of land. See 42 U.S.C. § 1712 (1988). While the FLMPA does not define
"land use plans," it provides the Secretary with nine criteria to use as guidelines for
formulating a strategy:
(1) use and observe the principles of multiple use and sustained yield
set forth in this and other applicable law;
(2) use a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated
consideration of physical, biological, economic, and other sciences;
(3) give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical
environmental concern;
(4) rely, to the extent it is available, on the inventory of the public
lands, their resources, and other values;
(5) consider present and potential uses of the public lands;
(6) consider the relative scarcity of the values involved and the availability of alternative means (including recycling) and sites for realization of
those values;
(7) weigh long-term benefits to the public against short-term benefits;
(8) provide for compliance with applicable pollution control laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other pollution standards
or implementation plans; and
(9) ... coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and management
CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT

activities . . . of other Federal departments and agencies and of the

States and local governments within which the lands are located ....
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (1988).
128 National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 879.
The NEPA is codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). For
more information about the NEPA, see supra note 35.
In part, the object of the NEPA and the FLPMA is to force agencies to consider
the environmental effects of their actions and to incorporate public input into their
decisions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b), 4332(2)(C) (1988); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(a),
1739(e) (19).
Neither the FLPMA nor NEPA have provisions for citizen suits. See 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. IV
1993). Therefore, NWF sought judicial review of the BLM's program under § 702 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). National WildlifeFed'n, 497 U.S. at 882 (quotation omitted). Section 702 of the APA provides: "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1988).
129 National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 886 (quotation omitted).

290

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:267

their aesthetic and recreational value to NWF members. 3 ° On
cross-motions for summary judgment,1 3 1 the District Court for the
District of Columbia found that NWF members' affidavits referred
only to land use in the vicinity of affected areas, and not to the use
of any specifically affected lands.1 1 2 Thus, the court held that NWF
lacked standing to challenge BLM's proposed action of withdrawal
revocation.1

3

In National Wildlife Federation v. Burford,"' the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 13 5 The appellate court held
that the affidavits submitted by NWF, when read along with the
entire record of the case, alleged specific facts sufficient to demonstrate an injury in fact upon which to premise standing and survive
130 See id. (quotation omitted). First, NWF sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the Department of the Interior from eliminating or altering the status of any of
the lands in the public domain under BLM's control. National Wildlife Fed'n, 676 F.
Supp. at 273. The Department of the Interior moved to dismiss the case, claiming
that NWF lacked standing to bring suit. Id. at 277. The District Court for the District
of Columbia granted NWF's motion for a preliminary injunction and denied Interior's motion to dismiss. Id. at 277, 279. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 835 F.2d at 327. The D.C. Circuit denied the Department of the Interior's petition for a rehearing. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 844 F.2d 889, 890
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
131 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 328 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd
878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
871 (1990). NWF submitted four additional affidavits in an attempt to meet the requirements for standing. Id. at 328 n.3.
132 Id. at 332. The Peterson Affidavit stated:
My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particularly those in the vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming have
been and continue to be adversely affected in fact by the unlawful actions of the Bureau and the Department. In particular, the South PassGreen Mountain area of Wyoming has been opened to the staking of
mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatens the
aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat potential of these lands.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 886 (quotation omitted). NWF member Richard
Erman's affidavit was similar to Peterson's, except that it pertained to withdrawal revocations in Arizona. Id. (quotation omitted).
133 National Wildlife Fed'n, 699 F. Supp. at 332. The court reasoned that the two
affidavits submitted by NWF's members failed to demonstrate standing because they
did not present allegations of injury with enough specificity to survive Interior's motion for summary judgment. Id.
134 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990).
135 Id. at 434. The court remanded for trial on the merits and declined to reinstate
the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the decision on the merits would be forthcoming. Id. at 425 n.2, 434. The appellate court also held that the district court
abused its discretion when it refused to allow NWF members to submit four additional
affidavits to support the group's standing. Id. at 433.
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a motion for summary judgment." 6 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari
to resolve the difficult issues posed by the Burford line of
7
cases.

13

In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,i" 8 the Supreme Court,
in a five to four majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, reversed
the decision of the D.C. Circuit. 39 Justice Scalia explained that
plaintiffs must identify an agency that has injured them in some
way and demonstrate that they have suffered a legal wrong or have
been adversely influenced or aggrieved, within the purview of the
relevant statute, by the challenged action.1 40 The Court held that
NWF's affidavits did not allege injuries sufficient upon which to
premise standing.'
The majority acknowledged that recreational
and aesthetic injuries were within the zone of interests of FLPMA
and NEPA.' 4 2 Justice Scalia declared, however, that the affidavits
in the National Wildlife Federation case failed to allege harm to a sufficient level of detail and demonstrate a concrete agency action
136 Id. at 430, 431. The affidavits, the D.C. Circuit asserted, contained adequate
details to require the district court to reach the merits of the case. Id. at 430.
137 Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 493 U.S. 1042, 1042 (1990).
138 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
139 Id. at 875, 900. justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, O'Connor, and Kennedy. Id. at 874. Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id. at 900 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 882, 883. "Agency action" includes any "rule" or action defined in the
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides in pertinent part:
"[R] ule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval
or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial
structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or
practices bearing on any of the foregoing ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
Agency action is defined as "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act .
5 U.S.C.
§ 551(13) (1988).
In addition to meeting the definition of agency action, Justice Scalia stated, the
challenged action must be "final" when review is pursued under the general review
provisions of the APA rather than under a specific statute. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497
U.S. at 882 (quotation omitted). See generally Garrity-Rokous, supra note 124 (discussing what constitutes final agency action).
141 National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889.
142 Id. at 886. Specifically, Justice Scalia stated: "We have no doubt that 'recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment' are among the sorts of interests those statutes were
specifically designed to protect. The only issue, then, is whether the facts alleged in
the affidavits showed that those interests of Peterson and Ernan were actually affected."
Id.
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that resulted in the harm. 14 3 In essence, Justice Scalia misapplied
procedural rules to reach the desired result of preventing NWF
44
from having a trial on the merits.1
Additionally, the majority declared that because there was no
final agency action within the meaning of the Administratve Procedure Act (APA), 4 5 the case was not ripe for review. 146 In an attempt to constrain the judiciary's ability to review agency action,
Justice Scalia reasoned that the plaintiffs were seeking to change
the way the Secretary of the Interior administered the BLM program, which was not truly an agency action. 1 47 The majority noted
that there was no regulation or order promulgated by the Department of Interior or BLM that created or defined the challenged
program. 148 The majority also observed that the program was con143 Id. at 889, 890. Overruling the court of appeals, the Supreme Court stated that
the decision below was incorrect because it presumed that the affidavits embraced the
specific facts necessary to present an issue for trial. Id. at 889. The National Wildlife
Federationmajority argued that granting standing based on the affidavits would defeat
the purpose of the summary judgment rule because it would prevent a party from
contesting a baseless claim. Id.
The majority, however, incorrectly characterized the appellate court's opinion as
assuming that NWF members used the specific land in question. Shinn, supra note
16, at 905. The Court supported this erroneos assumption by inaccurately portraying
an out-of-context portion of the court of appeals's decision. Id. The majority omitted
a crucial court of appeals finding that the Peterson affidavit could only refer to parts
of the affected land that were not previously open for mining. Id. (citing National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)). The Court's failure to acknowledge
this finding implied that the D.C. Circuit found only general averments in the affidavit with respect to land affected by the withdrawal program. Id. A careful reading of
the court of appeals opinion, however, shows that this is not correct. Id. (citing National Wildlife Fed'n, 878 F.2d at 430, 431).
144 See id. at 910. Examining Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), Justice Scalia
noted that the Court is not obliged to assume that general allegations support the
facts necessary to support the complaint. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889; see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that a motion for summary judgment must be granted if the non-moving party, after sufficient time for
discovery, is unable to establish an element of his case). Interpreting the requirements of section 702 of the APA,Justice Scalia explained that the burden of proof lies
upon the party seeking judicial review to allege the requisite facts. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 884-85 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)).
145 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-596 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
146 National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 892-93. "Ripeness" refers to the notion that a
case may be brought too soon and "not yet be ripe for adjudication." JOHN E. NowAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 2.12(d) (3d ed. 1986). The ripeness doctrine is supported by both pragmatism and policy considerations. Id. Concrete issues enable the
court to resolve cases without reaching constitutional issues. Id. As a practical matter,
"if the Court waits for an actual controversy, the whole constitutional problem may
just be eliminated by later developments." Id.
147 National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 891.
148 Id. at 890. The land withdrawal review program, the Court asserted, was "simply
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tinuously changing." 9 Therefore, the majority asserted, the
proper venue for recourse was not through the judiciary, but
rather through the legislative or executive branches. 50 Judicial review might only be appropriate, Justice Scalia stated, for each separate and individual revocation of a withdrawal or reclassification. 5 '
Thus, according to the majority, even though a case by case inquiry
into the land withdrawal review program would be frustrating to
NWF, there could be no extensive review or improvement of the
5 2
program through the judicial branch."
Finally, Justice Scalia declared, the courts cannot intervene in
an agency decision until the plaintiffs simplify the controversy to
judicially manageable proportions and demonstrate that the
agency's action has caused them either harm or an imminent
threat of harm.'
As the pleadings did not adequately define the
program or demonstrate an imminent threat of harm, the Justice
explained, judicial intervention would be improper. 54 What Justice Scalia failed to note was that NWF had previously challenged
BLM over the same course of conduct 155 and that Congress had
the name by which petitioners have occasionally referred to the continuing (and thus
constantly changing) operations of the BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation applications and the classifications of public lands and developing land use plans as required by the FLPMA." Id. Justice Scalia contended that the land withdrawal
program was actually a compilation of 1250 individual orders issued by BLM that
terminated existing classifications or revoked withdrawals. Id. (citation omitted).
Under the APA, the Justice concluded, the land withdrawal program would not properly be construed as agency action or final agency action unless BLM issued an order
or regulation which affected or encompassed all of the individually issued orders. Id.
at 890 n.2. See generally Peter H. A. Lehner, Note, JudicialReview of Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 627 (1983) (discussing the non-implementation of certain
statutes, legal actions brought to force implementation, and the Court's reluctance to
review administrative non-implementation).
149 National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 890. The Court posited that the individual
BLM orders could constitute "rules of general applicability" or individual agency "actions," despite finding that they did not meet the requirements for agency action. Id.
at 892, 892-93. These "rules," the Justice opined, represented BLM's intention to permit certain activities on land under their jurisdiction, to refuse to intervene with certain activities, and to take certain action when requested. Id. at 892. The Court stated
that these directives were not the kind of final agency action that is ripe for judicial
review because the action or inaction was discretionary and either did not immediately occur or did not harm the plaintiff. Id. at 892-93.
150 Id. at 894.
151 Id. at 892.
152 Id. at 894. Justice Scalia justified this "frustrating" result by stating that "the
traditional ... mode of operation of the courts" is to function in this fashion, requiring case by case adjudication rather than "across-the-board protection of our Nation's
wildlife ...

." Id.

Id. at 891.
Id. at 892-93.
155 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
153
154
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tried to inject an environmental conscience into federal land use
decisions by enacting the FLPMA and the NEPA 5 6
In dissent, Justice Blackmun vehemently argued that the majority had failed to understand that the courts should strive to construe procedural rules pragmatically in order to effectuate the just
and efficient settlement of legal disputes.1 57 To this end, the Justice rejected the majority's interpretation of standing requirements.1 58 Justice Blackmun also castigated the majority for not
finding that the district court had abused its discretion in refusing
to consider the additional affidavits filed by NWF 1 59 Additionally,
the dissent declined to address the ripeness issue, claiming that the
issue was not properly before the Court. 6
Justice Blackmun further argued that NWF alleged sufficient
facts to establish standing and withstand a summary judgment motion. " ' The dissent claimed that NWF's affidavits identified particular revocations that caused harm to the plaintiffs.1 62 In failing to
156 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1988 & Supp. IV 1993); supra notes 35, 127 (discussing, respectively, the NEPA and
the
157FLPMA).'
NWF, 497 U.S at 912 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated:

The District Court and today's majority fail to recognize the guiding
principle of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the principle that procedural rules should be construed pragmatically, so as to ensure the just
But where the Rules exand efficient resolution of legal disputes ....
pressly confer a range of discretion, a District Court may abuse its authority by refusing to take account of equitable concerns, even where its
action violates no express command. In my view, such an abuse of discretion occurred here.
Id. at 912-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 902 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 904-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 915 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 902, 904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Explaining the requirements that
NWF had to meet in order to have standing, Justice Blackmun pointed out that specific evidence showing an injury is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e),
which governs litigants' burdens in motions for summaryjudgment. Id. at 902 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted). The Justice stated that NWF fulfilled the
evidence portion of the requirement by submitting the sworn accounts of two members. Id. The specificity element, Justice Blackmun continued, was satisfied by examining the affidavits in the context of the record as a whole, thus completing the
requirements for standing to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 903-04
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 902 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The issue, the Justice
stressed, was whether there was a genuine question for trial, not whether NWF had
proven that it had standing to bring suit. Id. at 903 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
Justice noted that NWF alleged that the government's actions would cause increased
mining of public lands, which would damage the environment and therefore diminish the recreational use of the lands by NWF members. Id. at 900 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Also, the dissent noted, "evidence supported the Federation's assertion
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confer standing upon NWF, Justice Blackmun asserted, both the
interest
district court and the majority disregarded the judiciary's
163
in the 'just and efficient resolution of legal disputes."
Finally, the dissent agreed with the framework of the majority's analysis of the land withdrawal review program, but disagreed
with the result the majority reached in the case sub judice.1 The
true issue, Justice Blackmun explained, was whether the agency actions that allegedly violated the law were part of the agency action
in dispute, not whether the scope of the agency action challenged
was too broad. 6 5 According to the dissent, the fact that the land
withdrawal review program was never deemed a "program," but instead remained a series of individual agency actions, should not
bar its review by the judiciary. 166 Justice Blackmun would have,
therefore, remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the land withdrawal review program was an agency action
within the meaning of the APA.16 7
2.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

The Supreme Court further limited the types of injuries that
satisfy the injury in fact element in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.' 6 8
In Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs, Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders), brought suit to challenge a regulation promulgated under the
that on lands newly opened for mining, mining in fact would occur." Id. Concluding,
the dissent observed that prior to the action brought by NWF, 406 mining claims had
been filed for the South Pass-Green Mountain area and more than 7200 in twelve
other Western states had been filed as well. Id. at 900 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 912 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). With respect to the district court's refusal
to consider additional affidavits submitted by NWF, Justice Blackmun asserted that
the court had improperly terminated the lawsuit. Id. at 904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun opined that the district court ended proceedings via a technical mechanism, ignoring the massive nature of the litigation and instead reaching a
result that could have been legitimately averted. Id. This mistake, the Justice declared, was compounded by the majority's failure to appreciate the complexity and
expense of the underlying litigation, as well as by a failure to properly construe the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 904-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stated Justice Blackmun "'shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."' Id. (quotation
omitted).
164 See id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 913, 914-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 914-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); see RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Comment, Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife: Standingas ajudicially Imposed Limit on LegislativePower, 42 DuKE LJ. 1170,
1170-71 (1993) (asserting that "Justice Scalia's opinion in Defenders is an insupportable
judicial contraction of the legislative power to make judicially enforceable policy decisions") (footnote omitted).
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Endangered Species Act (ESA) by the Secretary of the Interior.1 6 9
The regulation at issue declared that federal agencies funding
projects in foreign countries had no duty to consult the Secretary
regarding the impact these projects would have upon the endangered species of the world. 170 As a result, federal agencies could
fund global projects without regard to their effect upon endangered species, but
could not do the same within the territorial
1
United States.

17

Within the ESA, there is explicit authorization for "any person" to obtain judicial review of agency action thought to violate
the Act. 172 Defenders brought suit under this provision to force
169 Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2135; see supra note 36 for a discussion of the
ESA.
The Secretary of the Interior moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing, and
the district court granted the Secretary's motion. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658
F. Supp. 43, 44, 48 (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988). The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851
F.2d 1035, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988). On remand, the Secretary again moved for summary
judgment on the issue of standing, and Defenders moved for summary judgment on
the merits. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1083 (D. Minn. 1989),
afrd sub nom. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2130 (1992). The district court denied the Secretary's motion on the grounds
that the Eighth Circuit had resolved the issue, and found for Defenders on the merits.
Id. at 1083-84, 1086. The court of appeals affirmed. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
911 F.2d 117, 125 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the case. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008,
2008 (1991).
170 Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2135; see also 50 C.F.R. 402.01 (1986) (1986 Rule).
After Congress passed the ESA in 1973, it was uncertain whether the ESA's obligations applied to United States government actions in foreign countries. Sunstein,
supra note 114, at 198. Then, in 1978, the Department of the Interior determined
that those actions were regulated. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. 402.02 (1978) (1978 Rule)).
In 1978, Congress amended the ESA and enacted the new section 7(a), with the specific intention of restating existing law on section 7, including the 1978 Rule on foreign consultation requirements. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1978). Despite the clear manifestation of congressional intent that federal agency
actions outside of the territorial United States were subject to the section 7 consultation process, the Department of the Interior reversed the policy in 1983. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 114 at 198 (citing 50 C.F.R. 402.01 (1986)) (other citation omitted).
The new regulation announced that only actions within the territorial United States
were governed by the consultation requirement. See 50 C.F.R. 402.01 (1986).
171 See 50 C.F.R. 402.01 (1986).
172 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988). The provision states, in part:
[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be
in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under
the authority thereof; or

(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Sec-
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the Department of the Interior to change its ruling.1 7' Defenders
premised their standing largely upon injuries to two members of its
organization. 174 Both members submitted affidavits containing
general allegations intended
to satisfy Article III and prudential
175
limitations upon standing.

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals's finding of
standing, holding that Defenders failed to demonstrate adequate
standing to seek judicial review of the regulation. 176 Because the
statute expressly granted to any person the right to bring suit to
challenge agency violations of the ESA, 1 77 the majority in effect
held that Congress can not delineate which kinds of harm satisfy
78
the injury in fact requirement.

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Thomas, authored the opinion of the Court. 79 TheJusretary to perform any act or duty ... which is not discretionary with the
Secretary.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any such
provision or regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such act or
duty, as the case may be.
Id. The statutory definition of "person" includes corporations, partnerhips, and associations such as the respondents. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1988). See supra note 36
for further discussion of the ESA.
173 Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2135. Specifically, Defenders sought an injunction to require the Secretary to restore the 1978 Rule. Id.
174 Id. at 2138.
The Court has long permitted organizations to premise standing upon injuries
suffered by their members. See, International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and
Agric. Implement Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281 (1986) (citations omitted)
(noting that it is permissible for an association to have standing as a representative of
its members); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
342 (1977) ("If the Commission were a voluntary membership organization .

.

. its

standing to bring this action as the representative of its constituents would be clear
under prior decisions of this Court.").
175 See Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2138. The affiants alleged that they had
already visited the habitat of an endangered species, that they intended to return to
those habitats for additional observation in the future, and that the regulation injured
them because it permitted federal agencies to fund projects that threatened to harm
endangered species and their habitats. Id.
176 Id. at 2146.
177 See 16 U.S.C. 1540(g) (1988). See supra note 172 for the text of Section
15 40(g).
178 See Pierce, supra note 168, at 1179 ("If, as Defenders suggests, the Court now believes that standing creates a judicially enforceable limit on congressional discretion,
rather than a prudential limit on judicial discretion, both the reasoning and results of
the Court's prior statutory standing cases are in grave doubt.").
179 Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2134-35. Justices Kennedy and Souter did not
join with Part III-B of the opinion, which concerned the issue of redressability. Id. at
2134, 2140.
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tice used six main lines of reasoning in concluding that Defenders
lacked standing.'
First, Justice Scalia determined that there was
insufficient proof of imminent, judicially cognizable injury in fact
to the plaintiff. 8 ' Second, the Justice found that the statute's language explicitly granting standing to "any person" was unconstitu8 2 Third, the Court rejected the
tional as applied in this context.1
ecosystem nexus, animal nexus, and professional nexus as theories
of standing to demonstrate injuries to the plaintiff.'
Fourth, the
Pierce, supra note 168, at 1173.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2138. The Court began the analysis of this issue
by enumerating the characteristics of a judicially cognizable injury. See id. at 2136
(citation omitted). The injury, wrote the Court, must be "concrete and particularized," as well as "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Id. (citations and quotation omitted). The Court opined that the affidavits failed to meet
these requirements due to a lack of temporal proof. Id. at 2138. An expression of
intent to visit and observe a species or its habitat in the future, the majority asserted,
"is simply not enough" to meet the imminent injury standard. Id.; see also Pierce, supra
note 168, at 1174. As Pierce points out, to meet the Court's requirements, the plaintiff was required to manifest an intent to return to the habitat on a specific date and
perhaps even purchase a plane ticket as evidence of that intention. See Pierce, supra
note 168, at 1174.
182 See Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2143, 2145 (citations omitted). The Court
noted:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right"...
is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed".. . . We have always rejected that vision
of our role.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (other citations and quotation omitted).
This marks the first time that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
statute that created a specific class of potential plaintiffs and authorized the members
of that class to sue for judicial review of an agency action that harmed the interests of
that class. See Pierce, supra note 168, at 1178. Rather, the Court had previously
respected the intent of Congress to grant standing to particular groups of plaintiffs
with similar interests in specific agency proceedings. Id. (citations omitted). The radical change presented by Justice Scalia's opinion was demonstrated by Cass Sunstein,
who recounted the history of the law of standing in an effort to document the extent
of the Court's departure from it. See generally Sunstein, supra note 114. If the Court
now deems it appropriate to use standing to enforce limitations on congressional discretion, as Defenders of Wildlife suggests, rather than to simply use standing as a prudential limitation on judicial discretion, then all previously decided statutory standing
cases may be in doubt. Pierce, supra note 168, at 1179.
183 Defenders of Wildlfe, 112 S. Ct. at 2139-40. Defenders advanced three "nexus"
theories in support of its argument that its members would suffer legally redressable
harm from projects adversely affecting endangered species. Id. at 2139. The theory
of the "ecosystem nexus" is that a project harming any portion of an integrated ecosystem also harms anyone who uses any part of that ecosystem. Id. The "animal nexus"
theory hypothesizes that any project having a negative impact on an endangered species also injures anyone having an interest in observing the species at any location,
such as a zoo. Id. Finally, the "vocational nexus" theory proposes that a project that
adversely affects the survival of an endangered species injures anyone who has a pro180
181
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majority concluded that the judicial action prayed for by the suit
would not redress the injuries alleged. 184 Fifth, Justice Scalia articulated that the procedural injury complained of by the plaintiff
was an insufficient basis upon which to premise standing. 185 Finally, the Court enunciated, granting judicial review of the plaintiff's claims would do a disservice to the "take care" clause and
186
principle of separation of powers.
fessional interest in that species. Id. The majority rejected these theories, characterizing the animal nexus and vocational nexus thoeries as "beyond all reason." Id.
184 Id. at 2140. This is Part III-B of the opinion, where Justice Scalia was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas. Id. at 2134.
First, Justice Scalia stated, the plaintiff failed to implead the agencies that funded
the offending projects. Id. at 2140. Thus, the Justice continued, any relief granted
would affect only the Secretary of the Interior and not the other agencies involved.
Id. Justice Scalia posited that, at most, the Court could order the Secretary to revise
the regulation to require consultation with respect to foreign projects, but this requirement would only apply to those agencies that were bound to comply with the
Secretary's regulation. Id. As this was an open question, the Justice opined, the underlying suit would not redress Defenders' injuries. Id. ;see Pierce, supra note 168, at
1183-84 (stating that this reasoning is at odds with precedent, and "ignores the reality
that all federal agencies routinely conform their conduct to decisions of the Supreme
Court").
Second, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court could not redress the injury because
federal agencies only provide a fraction of the aggregate financing required for foreign projects. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2142. Thus, the Justice concluded, the
prayed for relief would not redress the injury because the plaintiffs did not indicate
that the relevant projects would be suspended or produce less harm if federal agency
funding were discontinued. Id.
The dissent, however, noted that the partial funding of one of the challenged
projects amounted to $170 million in aid to a country whose annual gross national
product was only six billion dollars. See id. at 2157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Also, Justice Blackmun declared, an agency could exert considerable
influence over the manner in which a project proceeds without providing 100% of
the funding. Id. at 2156-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 2142-43. The Court noted that the court of appeals characterized Defenders's injury as procedural. Id. at 2142. A person, the majority concluded, cannot
obtain judicial review of an agency action based only upon injury done to a procedural right. Id. at 2143; Pierce, supra note 168, at 1185. The majority qualified this
conclusion in several ways, however, raising questions about how such a holding
would apply in other contexts. Pierce, supra note 168, at 1185-86; see Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. at 2142-43; Pierce, supra note 168, at 1185-86 (describing the restrictions that the Court placed on its conclusion).
186 Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. at 2145 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3). The
Court first examined cases that denied plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge government conduct on constitutional grounds when they failed to premise their suits on
statutes authorizing judicial intervention. Id. at 2143-44 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984); Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 483 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974); Doremus v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam);
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126,
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Of these reasons, only the first two commanded the full support of the sixJustices who joined in portions of the majority opinion. 18 7 Thus, under the Court's analysis, the grant of standing
under the ESA failed for two interrelated reasons. 188 First, according to the majority, no citizen could meet the Article III injury in
fact element if the only injury suffered was from intangible harm
that resulted from the failure of the executive branch to follow the
law.18 9 Second, Justice Scalia opined, such suits would violate the
Article II principle that it is the executive's role to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed."' 90
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, concurred with the
judgment of the Court, condemning the ESA citizen suit provision
as constitutionally flawed.' 9 ' The Justice agreed with the majority
in part, stating that Congress can specifically define what injuries
or events give rise to claims under a particular statute where none
may previously have existed. 9 The Justice acknowledged, however, that there are limits to Congress's power to confer upon
plaintiffs the right to challenge an agency action in court.'9 3 The
concurrence also underscored the need for a concrete showing of
129-30 (1922)). The reasoning in those cases, opined the Court, extended to situations where a statute explicitly authorizes judicial review of agency actions. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 214445; see Pierce, supra note 168, at 1187 (citing Defenders of
Wildlife, 112. S. Ct. at 2144-45) (stating that "the Court for the first time transposed
this method of avoidingjudicial involvement in some classes of disputes into contexts
in which Congress has limited agency action by statute and has explicitly called on
federal courts to enforce that statutory limit against agencies").
187 Pierce, supra note 168, at 1174.
188 Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91
MICH. L. Rxv. 1793, 1797 (1993).
189 Id.; see Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 (rejecting the proposition that the
"injury in fact" element of the standing test could be satisfied by "congressional conferral upon all persons ... [a] right to have the Executive observe the procedures
required by law").
190 Krent & Shenkman, supra note 188, at 1797; Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); see Sunstein, supra note 114, at 215-20 (demonstrating
how the opinion in Defenders can be interpreted as the logical outgrowth of Justice
Scalia's writings on the separation of powers aspects of standing). See generally, Gene
R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L. J. 1141
(1993) (criticizingJustice Scalia's position on standing and the separation of powers);
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983) (setting forth then-Judge Scalia's position on the
interaction of the standing doctrine and the principle of the separation of powers).
191 Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2146, 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Kennedy
wrote that Congress "has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before and I do not
read the Court's opinion to suggest a contrary view." Id. (citation omitted).
193 Id. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
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194
some injury upon which to premise a citizen suit.

The constitutional flaw identified by the concurrence, however, is different from that identified by the majority and is easy to
correct.' 9 Justice Kennedy explicitly acknowledged that Congress
has the power to confer standing by statute.1 9 6 To resolve the constitutional objections raised by the majority, the Justice implied
that Congress must identify a general public interest in or benefit
derived from endangered species and demonstrate how the loss of
an injury to a citizen that the judiciary
those species 19constitutes
7
must protect.

Key to resolving the difficulties expressed by Justice Kennedy's
concurrence are the "novel" nexus theories of standing proposed
within the plaintiffs' affidavits, such as the ecosystem nexus theory
and the geographic nexus theory. 198 The majority opinion rejected these theories as "beyond all reason."1 9 9 Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Stevens accepted the theories, and Justices Kennedy and Souter suggested that under different circumstances they
may be of substantial merit."° Despite the insufficient factual record before the Court in this case, asserted Justice Kennedy, there
194

Id.

Pierce, supra note 168, at 1181.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 214647 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Justice
opined that Congress must "identify the injury... and relate the injury to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit." Id. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197 See id. ESA's citizen suit provision, stated Justice Kennedy, fails to satisfy these
minimum requirements "because while the statute purports to confer a right on 'any
person.., to enjoin.., the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter,' it
does not of its own force establish that there is an injury in 'any person' by virtue of
any 'violation."' Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1) (A) (1988)) (alteration in
original).
198 See Brief for Respondents at 26-30, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130 (1992) (No. 90-1424). Under the geographic nexus theory, Defenders's members have standing because they were present at the project sites to study endangered
species and their habitats. Id. at 26. Because those projects "may affect" the species
and habitats in the area, consultation under section 7 of the ESA is required. Id. The
ecosystem nexus theory of standing is based upon Congress's declaration of purpose
in the ESA "'to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved .... ' Id. at 27 (quoting 16
U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988)). Defenders interpreted this language as a Congressional
manifestation of intent to address the problem of decrease animal species at the
ecosystem level. Id.
199 Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2139. The Court stated that "[sitanding is not
'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,' but ... requires . . . a factual
showing of perceptible harm." Id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).
200 See id. at 2154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 2147 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Id. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
195
196
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was no need to foreclose the possibility that nexus theories similar
to those proposed by Defenders' affidavits would support a standing claim in a future case.2 °1 Justice Blackmun was also receptive
20 2
to the plaintiff's theories of environmental standing.
This suggests that the majority of the Court does not share
Justice Scalia's characterization of the theories as "beyond all reason." 20 3 Therefore, most members of the Court would likely accept
a legislative finding that the theories adequately describe injuries
which the ESA seeks to protect and would not find the statute unconstitutional when applied to protect those interests. 20 4 To find
the ESA unconstitutional after such a legislative endorsement of
the nexus theories, the Court would have to declare the legislative
20 5
adoption of widely accepted theories of biodiversity "irrational."
Such a finding would require the Court to reject "the commonsense notion that a biologist who has devoted a lifetime to study of
the Asian leopard is injured when the last leopard meets its demise."20 6 Thus, to overcome the votes against standing in Defenders
of Wildlife, Congress need only explicitly define the class of injured
plaintiffs as those having a nexus with the area, animal, or ecosys201 Id. Justice Kennedy, evincing an unwillingness to dismiss the nexus theories
entirely, referred to Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society and quoted
the following passage: "respondents ... undoubtebly have alleged a sufficient 'injury
in fact' in that the whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely
affected by continued whale harvesting." Id. (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986)).
202 Id. at 2154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Crucial to Justice Blackmun's differing
opinion with respect to this matter, and to the ecosystem nexus theory in particular,
was the Justice's understanding that ecosystems and species suffering environmental
harm are often geographically distant from the area where the challenged action occurred. Id. The very nature of environmental injuries, explained the dissent, proves
the majority opinion incorrect. Id. "Environmental destruction," wrote the Justice,
"may affect animals travelling over vast geographical ranges... or rivers running long
geographical courses." Id. (citing Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 231 n.4; Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1050, 1061 (1992)). In Japan Whaling, opined Justice
Blackmun, the Court acknowledged the harm to American whale watchers that resulted from Japanese whaling activities. Id. (citingJapanWhaling, 478 U.S. at 231 n.4).
Second, the Justice referred to Arkansas v. Oklahoma, in which the Court recognized
harm suffered by Oklahoma residents due to the emissions of a wastewater treatment
plant 39 miles upstream from the Oklahoma border. Id. (citing Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 1050, 1061). In conclusion, the Justice noted, the Court
should not use a plaintiffs inability to pinpoint the precise location of an animal's
slaughter or the point source of a toxic waste emission to deny a finding of injury. Id.
203 See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (describing the position of Justices Kennedy, Souter, Stevens, Blackmun, and O'Connor in support of the "nexus"
theories of standing); Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2139.
204 Pierce, supra note 168, at 1183.
205 Id. (citation omitted).
206 Id.
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Justice Blackmun,joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented in Defenders of Wildlife, insisting that the majority had launched a "slashand-bum expedition through the law of environmental standing."2 0 The dissent rested upon two primary objections to the majority opinion.20 9 First, the dissent posited, Defenders raised a
genuine issue of fact as to injury and redressability sufficient to survive the motion for summary judgment. 210 Second, the dissent reby1
jected the majority view that a procedural injury defined 21
Congress is an insufficient premise upon which to base standing.
Above all, Justice Blackmun's opinion evinced a fear that the Court
is placing new restrictions on Congress's constitutionally rooted authority to provide for citizen suits stemming from procedural
212
injuries.
See Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2151, 2160 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2151 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Blackmun wrote that the Court failed to apply the proper standard
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) for showing a genuine issue of material
fact for standing and instead demanded "what is likely an empty formality." Id. at
2152, 2153 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Application of the proper standard, the dissent asserted, would result in a finding that the affidavits and testimony of the Defenders affiants demonstrated sufficient issues that could only be resolved at trial. Id. at
2152 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun declared that a reasonable factfinder could find, based on the affidavits and testimony of the two members of Defenders of Wildlife, that either would return shortly to the the project sites. Id. The
"injury in fact" standard, the Justice noted, would be satisfied upon such a finding. Id.
In support of this assertion, Justice Blackmun intimated that the Court should not
stand on ceremony by demanding unreasonably detailed factual presentations to
demonstrate environmental injury. See id. at 2154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 2151-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted that Congress uses procedural rules to give the executive branch a large degree of flexibility.
Id. at 2159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Espousing a different constitutional philosophy from that of the majority, the dissent complained that the Court's opinion inappropriately enlarged the domain of the executive branch. Id.; see id. at 2145. The
Justice wrote that by declaring ESA's standing provision unconstitutional as applied in
this case, the majority opinion "reflect[ed] an unseemly solicitude for an expansion of
power of the executive branch." Id. at 2159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for questioning Congress's ability to
force the Executive Branch to observe procedures mandated by law. Id. This idea was
clearly articulated in Marbuiy v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "[t] he
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). By intimating that procedural injuries are not constitutionally cognizable, the majority subverted Marbury's underlying premise. See Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2159, 2160 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
212 See Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2151-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
Justice "fear[ed] the Court seeks to impose fresh limitations on the constitutional authority of Congress to allow citizen-suits in the federal courts for injuries deemed
'procedural' in nature." Id. Most government conduct, according to the dissent, can
207
208
209
210

304

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:267

To ensure compliance with ESA, Congress declared that any
person can bring suit to enforce the Act's provisions. 3 Further,
the inclusion of the citizen suit provision stemmed rationally from
congressional findings of fact, included in ESA, that the loss of genetic global biodiversity harms all people.21 4 Therefore, Justice
Scalia's rejection of standing is a direct repudiation of the validity
of Congress's factual determinations with respect to injury and the
rationality of the citizen suit provision.2 1 5 In so doing, the
Supreme Court encroached upon the legislative domain.21 6
III.

THE ANTICIPATED IMPACT OF JUSTICE GINSBURG

As Defenders of Wildlife and National Wildlife Federationdemonstrate, the standing doctrine is particularly significant to the future
of environmental law. 217 Despite Justice Scalia's attempt to use
be characterized as procedural. Id. at 2158 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Therefore, the
dissent continued, most injuries that occur as the result of government conduct can at
some general level be described as procedural. Id. Justice Blackmun stated that the
majority opinion created considerable uncertainty with respect to these types of legal
actions as courts seek to understand what the majority opinion meant when it declared that "'procedural' injuries are not constitutionally cognizable injuries." Id.
Examining ESA's procedural consultation requirement, the Justice compared it
to the one approved in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, where the
Court explicitly found standing to sue. Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986)). Similar to the statute at issue in Japan
Whaling, the Justice wrote, the ESA requires consultation with the Secretary of the
Interior to insure that no agency action proceeds without a full consideration of its
potential effects on listed species; after consultation occurs, the agency action must be
designed to avoid jeopardizing endangered species. Id. The dissent declared that
"these action-forcing procedures are 'designed to protect some threatened concrete
interest,' of persons who observe and work with endangered or threatened species."
Id. at 2159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 n.8).
Thus,Justice Blackmun concluded, the majority opinion's assertion that the plaintiffs
were not "'seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could
impair a separate concrete interest of theirs'" was groundless. Id. (quoting Defenders,
112 S. Ct. at 2142).
213 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of
Respondents at 3, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 901424); see 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
214 Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of
Respondents at 2, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife at 3, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 901424).
215 See Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2146; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of Respondents at 2, 3, Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 90-1424); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
216 See Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) ("[T]his Court has previouslyjustified a relaxed review of congressional delegation to the Executive on grounds that Congress . . . has subjected the exercise of
that power to judicial review ....
The Court's intimation today . . . threatens this
understanding upon which Congress has undoubtebly relied.").
217 Robichaud, supra note 103, at 444 (citations omitted) (stating that "[c]urrent
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standing to constrain judicial activism, the doctrine remains a crucial component of the political process.218 Arguably, the doctrine
gives the Court the very weapon that it needs to implement a less
protective environmental policy than Congress intended.1 9 As
noted by Professor Tribe, recent decisions demonstrate the Court's
view of the merits of a case dictate its concluwillingness to let its 220
standing.
to
as
sions
The trend toward constraining environmental standing runs
contrary to earlier Supreme Court decisions, such as SCRAp121 and
judicial restraint has altered the focus of standing requirements, has led to uncertainty, and has posed new challenges for future environmental litigants") (footnote
omitted); see Shinn, supra note 16, at 910 (contending that "[t]he Lujan majority misapplied the standing doctrine to reach a specific outcome"); Sunstien, supra note 114,
at 165 (stating that Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife may be "one of the most important
standing cases since World War II").
218 See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, JudicialActivism and Restraint in the
Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 343, 344 (1989) (cita-

tions omitted) (stating that "the proper role of the courts in our system of government has long been the source of considerable controversy" when the courts review
administrative action).
219 Id. at 346. In this article, Professors Levy and Glicksman examined the Court's
environmental law decisions and concluded that they exemplify the Court's shift
"from activism to restraint in the regulatory context." Id. at 358. This shift ended the
relative success that environmental litigants experienced during the early years of environmental litigation, from 1965 to 1975. See id. (footnote omitted). This period,
however, was followed by one in which the Supreme Court abandoned institutional
activism. Id. at 361.
The policy ofjudicial restraint is justified on the grounds that courts do not possess the requisite technical expertise to oversee the implementation and interpretation of complex statutes. Id. at 365 (citations omitted). Judicial restraint is justified
on the grounds that "Congress has delegated the decisionmaking authority to the
agencies." Id. These justifications are based on the "assumption that administrative
agencies will faithfully implement statutory policies." Id. at 366. This assumption may
or may not be valid, but the fact remains that some administrative agencies pursue
policies that are inconsistent with Congress's statutorily manifested public policy
objectives. Id. (citation omitted); see also Glicksman, supra note 115, at 253 (explaining that the federal judiciary's retrenchment with respect to the ability of environmental litigants to bring suit is due not to judicial restraint but to an attempt to
dictate policy under the guise of judicial restraint).
220 LAWRENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985). Professor Tribe wrote:
[T]he result has been the creation of special, largely unprincipled, exceptions to the basically liberal rules of standing to keep out cases of a
kind the Court does not want to have to deal with. At the same time,
the converse has been true: the Court has gone out of its way to consider the merits of particular cases that it wanted to decide even where
the claimant's standing was at best tenuous under the standards of the
formal rules.
Id.
221 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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Sierra Club,2 2 2 that liberalized the standing doctrine. 2 2' These cases
reflected a pre-Justice Scalia conception of standing that did not
necessarily involve a separation of powers debate. 224 The Court's
central premise then was that it is the courts' duty to "say what the
law is"2 2 5 and thereby effectuate the will of Congress. 226 For example, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission,22 7 the Supreme Court defined the judicial role in protecting the natural environment as insuring that the
vast federal bureaucracy does not destroy the legislative goals of
Congress.2 28 Moreover, in InternationalPrimate Protection League v.
Administrators of Tulane EducationalFund,"9 the Court said that the
222 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).

223 See DAVIS, supranote 87 at § 22.02-2 (asserting that SCRAP was "an all-time high
in Supreme Court liberality on the subject of standing").
224 See Hays, supra note 93, at 1000 (citations omitted). Before the separation of
powers doctrine became central to the definition of standing, courts granted environmental litigants access to the legal system in response to widespread social and congressional concern about environmental protection. Id.
225 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). In Marbury v. Madison,
the Supreme Court "emphasized the necessity for judicial protection of vested or legal
rights" and stated that the role of the courts is to protect the rights of individuals.
Nichol, supra note 70, at 1919-20 (citation omitted).
226 Hays, supra note 93, at 1001 (citations omitted).
227 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Calvert Cliffs represents the first time the
Supreme Court interpreted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Id. at
1111. The petitioners argued that rules adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission
(Commission) governing public review of nuclear environmental issues did not comply with NEPA. Id. at 1111-12. The Commission argued that NEPA's requirements
were so broad and vague that their actions were well within the strictures of that
statute. Id. at 1112. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the
judiciary can review agency decisions to insure compliance with the procedural requirements of NEPA and held that the Commission's rules violated the Act. Id. at
1112, 1115.
228 Id. at 1111. Writing for the D.C. Circuit, Judge Wright explained:
These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become a flood
of new litigation-litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our
natural environment. Several recently enacted statutes attest to the
commitment of the Government to control, at long last, the destructive
engine of material "progress." But it remains to be seen whether the
promise of this legislation will become a reality. Therein lies the judicial role ....
Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in
the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.
Id. (citations omitted).
229 500 U.S. 72 (1991). InternationalPrimatearose out of the efforts of animal rights
groups that sought to bar several scientific laboratories, including National Institutes
of Health (N.I.H.), from using certain monkeys in federally-funded medical experiments. Id. at 74-75. The district court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining N.I.H. from using monkeys for medical research. Id. at 75-76. On appeal,
N.I.H. argued that the petitioners did not have sufficient standing to seek the injunction. Id. at 76. The Fifth Circuit agreed and dismissed the case, holding that the
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relevant standing inquiry is whether the law at issue in the controversy has conferred upon the plaintiffs a cause of action. 230 Justice
Marshall further noted that standing is a question of substantive
law, determined by referring to the statutory and constitutional
provisions at the base of the claim. 23 1 This is markedly different
than the tone of recent standing decisions.
While it appears that recent Supreme Court cases cast a long
pall over the future of environmental litigation, the confirmation
of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme CourtJustice provides a ray of
hope for a more enlightened approach to allowing environmental
plaintiffs to seek judicial review of agency decisions.232 While sitting on the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
Justice Ginsburg participated in many decisions that provide insight into her judicial philosophy regarding environmental
233
standing.
In City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NationalHighway),2 34 for example, the complainants challenged the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
(NHTSA) failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
covering Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards.2 3 5
petitioners lacked standing. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs
had met the constitutional requirements for standing. Id. at 77.
230 See id. The Court wrote that "standing is gauged by the specific common-law,
statutory or constitutional claims that a party presents." Id.
231 Id.

232 David Sive, Will Justice Ginsburg Color Court Green, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 11, 1993, at
22. Analyzing many of Justice Ginsburg's court of appeals decisions, Sive characterized Ginsburg's view of standing as "apparently liberal" and not "narrow." Id. Specifically, Sive claimed that it would be hard to imagine Justice Ginsburg endorsingJustice
Scalia's technical distinction between Defenders of Wildlife and Japan Whaling. Id.
233 See id. at 18, 22-23 (discussing several of Justice Ginsburg's environmental rulings); see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.
(NHTSA), 912 F.2d 478, 482-83, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (granting standing to two cities
challenging an agency's non-compliance with NEPA); National Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir 1982), rev'd sub nora. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deciding that EPA had misconstrued a statute when drafting a regulation relating to the
Clean Air Act); Dellums v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d 968,
984 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the court should
defer to congressional findings of fact with respect to what types of injuries satisfy
standing under different statutory schemes).
234 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
235 Id. at 482-83. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 sets a mandatory
CAFE standard at 27.5 miles per gallon. Id. at 482. The NHTSA exercised its authority to adjust the CAFE standard by rulemaking, but failed to prepare environmental
impact statements as required by NEPA. Id. (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the city and state petitioners had standing to
sue, but rejected their claim on the merits. Id. at 485, 490.
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The court, including then-Judge Ginsburg, concluded that the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) had standing under
NEPA to challenge the CAFE standard premised upon the potential injury that would result from global warming. 23 6 Fully embracing the theory of geographical nexus, the D.C. Circuit held that
NRDC had demonstrated that the failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement created the risk of an environmental injury that would directly affect NRDC members.2 3 7 Justice
Ginsburg's willingness to accept the attenuated line of causation
pleaded by the plaintiffs in this case and concomitant adoption of
the geographical nexus theory logically imply thatJustice Ginsburg
23 8
would not have sided with the majority in Defenders of Wildlife.
NationalHighway suggests thatJustice Ginsburg would have granted
standing under the "novel" ecosystem nexus and geographical
2 9
nexus theories advanced by the plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife.
Justice Ginsburg was participated as a member of the appellate
panel that granted the National Wildlife Federation standing in
National Wildlife Federation v. Buford.24" Although the Supreme
Court later reversed the D.C. Circuit's grant of standing, Justice
Ginsburg did not let the general warnings contained in the Court's
opinion constrain her reasoning in subsequent cases. 2 4 1 Notwithstanding National Wildlife Federation,Justice Ginsburg granted standing based upon an attenuated line of causation in National
Highway.242
Justice Ginsburg's opinions concerning congressional fact236

Id. at 485.

Judge Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion in NationalHighway, but agreed with

the court's position on the standing issue. Id. at 504 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., concurring).
The court explained that "[g]lobal warming refers to an average increase in
global temperatures caused by human activities," especially the emission of gases into
the atmosphere where they "act like the glass in a greenhouse. Much of the build-up
of carbon dioxide and other gases is a result of combustion of fossil fuels, including

gasoline." Id. at 493 n.1.
237 Id. at 494 (citation omitted).
238 See id. (supporting, by implication, the geographical nexus theory of standing);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1992) (describing the nexus

theories as "beyond all reason").
239 See NationalHighway, 912 F.2d at 494 (supporting, by implication, the geographical nexus theory of standing); Defenders of Wldli[e, 112 S. Ct. at 2139 (describing the
nexus theories as "beyond all reason").
240 878 F.2d 422, 424, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub. nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife

Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
241 Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 900 (1990); Hays, supra note 93,

at 1039.
242 See National Highway, 912 F.2d at 504 (citation omitted) (RB. Ginsburg, J.,

concurring).
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finding and its bearing on the Judicial Branch are likely to affect
environmental litigation as well. 243 In Dellums v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,24 4 Justice Ginsburg expounded upon
245
the judiciary's need to defer to Congress's informed judgment.
The Justice contended that resolution of the standing debate often
entails a high degree of predictive fact finding into areas outside
the scope of judicial expertise.2 46 In these areas, Justice Ginsburg
asserted, courts should not contradict the judgment of Congress
unless there is a clear showing
that Congress's conclusions do not
247
meet the test of rationality.
This indicates that Justice Ginsburg would not have denied
standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.2 48 In Defenders of Wildlife,
the Court refused to extend standing to "any person" alleging an
injury deemed procedural in nature.24 9 In enacting the citizen suit
provision of ESA, Congress rationally concluded that "any person"
is injured by loss to biodiversity, and thus may bring suit to enforce
the Act's provisions. 25 0 Justice Ginsburg would likely have deferred
to this finding and would have granted the Defenders of Wildlife
243 See Dellums v. United Sattes Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d 968, 984

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (R.B. GinsburgJ., dissenting) ("When Congress has determined that
a certain action will acheive a given end, courts generally should defer to that
judgment.")
244 863 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
245 Id. at 984 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs in Dellums were "several
members of Congress, three organizations opposed to apartheid and one concerned
with nuclear proliferation, an exiled black South African anti-apartheid activist
named Henry Isaacs, and an unemployed American uranium miner named Robert
Chavez." Id. at 970 (footnotes omitted). They brought suit seeking review of two final
orders issued by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that
granted and declined to revoke licenses needed to import uranium hexaflouride into
the United States from South Africa. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that these orders
violated the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Id. (citation omitted). The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that all of the plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge the NRC rule. Id. at 980. Judge Ginsburg dissented,
claiming that standing did not bar the claims of all of the petitioners. Id. at 987 (R.B.
Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 984 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg asserted that "[w]hen
Congress has determined that a certain action will achieve a given end, courts generally should defer to that judgment." Id. In Dellums, opined the dissent, the court's
deference should reach its zenith because Congress is legislating in the area of foreign policy, where the court lacks expertise. Id.
247 Id.
248 See

id.; lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2143, 2145 (1992). See
supra notes 168-212 and accompanying text for a discussion of Defenders of Wildlife.
249 Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2143.
250 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of
Respondents at 3, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 901424). Under ESA, the three factual requirements for standing are: (1) "all persons
suffer personal injury from loss of biodiversity;" (2) "that injury is incontestably tracea-
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plaintiffs standing to bring suit. 251
Dellums is also significant because Justice Ginsburg directly addressed the level of specificity required to establish injury for purposes of standing.25 2 Justice Ginsburg asserted that the standing
requirement does not require the plaintiff to plead certainty that a
favorable result will redress the underlying injury. 25 3 Rather, the
Justice explained, the pleadings must only demonstrate the mere
likelihood that a favorable result will do so. 25 4 Reflecting upon the
general lessons taught by a landmark case, a federal statute, and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Ginsburg opined that
plaintiffs are entitled to every opportunity to amend pleadings until those pleadings are satisfactory. 255 Finally, the Justice averred
that the majority was misguided in its assumption that temporal
25 6
distance diminishes causation or redressibility.
This philosophy is particularly applicable to environmental litigation. 25 7 Justice Ginsburg's decisions while on the D.C. Circuit
demonstrate a willingness to find injury in fact and causation even
when the harm is hard to define and the resulting damage is reble to unchecked federal agency actions violative of the Act"; and (3) that "redress
results when courts enjoin violations of the Act pursuant to Section I I(g)." Id.
251 See Dellums 863 F.2d at 984 (noting that courts should defer to Congress when
addressing issues outside of the judiciary's expertise).
252 See id. at 987 (R.B. Ginsburg J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 986 (quotation and citation omitted).
254 Id. (quotation omitted).

255 Id. (citations omitted). Continuing, Justice Ginsburg described the "well-accepted view" that the judiciary must allow a plaintiff every effort to increase the level
of specificity of the pleadings to attain standing, rather than deny judicial relief based
on defective or insufficient initial allegations. Id. (citations omitted).
256 Id. at 986 n.7 (citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg pointed to two major cases
to support this assertion. Id. (citing Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, 31 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (quotation omitted); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory

Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973)). In AutologJustice Ginsburg noted,
the court was properly concerned not with the "length of the chain of causation," but

rather with the plausibility of the connection between the offending action and the
injury complained of by the suit. Id. (citing Autolog, 731 F.2d at 31 (quotation omitted)). Second, Justice Ginsburg referenced SCRAP, in which the Supreme Court

granted standing even though the line of causation was attenuated. Id. (citing SCRAP,
412 U.S. at 688-90).
257 See Hays, supra note 93, at 1010. Hays stated that:
[Tihe doctrine of standing in environmental cases has developed a
number of unique characteristics. Among the issues particularly relevant to standing in environmental disputes are: the types of injuries
recognized; the degree to which those injuries must be specific to a particular claimant; the required geographical relationship between the
claimant and the environmental harm; the certainty of threatened injury; and the causal relationship between the challenged conduct and
the injury complained of.
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mote. 25 8 Enmeshed in this willingness is a firmly rooted understanding of the complex nature of environmental injury and
damage.2 5 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

The time to debate the value of a clean environment has long
passed. To protect the environment, Congress must enact laws
that promote and safeguard its continued existence; the Supreme
Court must interpret those laws with a clear and effective environmental ethic and procedure; and the executive branch must enforce the laws in good faith along the lines drawn by the Supreme
Court. Plagued by irresponsible dogmatic constraints, however,
the Supreme Court is philosophically unequipped to craft an effective approach to environmental injuries.2 6 °
The Supreme Court's difficulty with the injury in fact element
of standing stems from the judicial philosophy of Justice Scalia,
who often sways the Court on environmental issues.261 Justice
Scalia views the question of standing as an essential element of the
Court's attempts to constrain judicial activism and support the separation of powers. 6 2 Despite claims that this is part of a policy of
judicial restraint, however, the Supreme Court is actually making
policy decisions by using standing to screen out cases that seek relief contrary to the statutory interpretation or other goals preferred
258 See supra notes 232-259 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's
apparent position on the "injury in fact" element of the standing test).
259 See City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F. Supp.
478, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (R.B. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (conceding that standing
can be based upon injury to an environmental interest).
260 See supra notes 168-216 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and its flawed reasoning and result).
261 See generally Patti A. Meeks, Justice Scalia and the Demise of EnvironmentalLaw Standing, 8J. LAND USE & ENV-rL. L. 343 (1993) (examining the negative effect thatJustice
Scalia's positions on standing and the separation of powers doctrine have had on
environmental litigation).
262 Scalia, supra note 190, at 881 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia's thesis is that by
ignoring the role of separation of powers in formulating a standing test, the court
runs the risk of encroaching upon the process of self-governance. Id. (citation omitted). According to Justice Scalia, there is
a functional relationship, which can best be described by saying that the
law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions
of the majority, and excludes them from the even more undemocratic
role of prescribing how the other two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself
Id. at 894; see also Meeks, supranote 261, at 355 (contending thatJustice Scalia's ascension to the Supreme Court gave him the opportunity to change the law of standing to
further his separation of powers goals, especially with respect to environmental law).
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263

by the Court.
Using the injury in fact test as enunciated by Justice Scalia in
Defenders of Wildlife, a plaintiff with a widespread, concrete injury
that results from government action or inaction lacks standing,
even if the statute that the suit is premised upon expressly seeks to
prevent that very injury. 2 ' Thus, the Court, rather than Congress,
is deciding what is an Article III injury in fact. This is judicial activism, despite Justice Scalia's assertion to the contrary.2 6 5
Where plaintiffs bring a broad challenge to an agency decision
or general rule, requiring hard and fast evidence of a particularized injury makes little sense.2 6 6 Such evidence may indeed exist,
but a particularized injury is not likely to illustrate the defects in an
imperfect agency rule such as the one at issue in Defenders of Wildlife.267 Rather, the evidence is likely to represent one minor facet
of a larger problem that the government needs to address.2 6 8 This
does not meld easily with Article III's standing requirements because the injuries are often too large for the Court to incorporate
into traditional notions of personal injuries.2 6 9 In these types of
situations, the Court must defer to Congress, which is better
equipped to undertake the detailed fact-finding neccessary to illustrate and address such injuries.
263 Meeks, supra note 261, at 380 (stating thatJustice Scalia's "strict application of
the separation of powers principle and disregard for the 'checks and balances' of our
governmental system is in actuality, and ironically, setting up the executive branch as
the predominant governmental branch"); see also Hays, supranote 93, at 1001 (noting
that when a court decides not to adjudicate a case on separation of powers grounds,
agency decisions and governmental policy are affected as much as when a court decides the case on the merits).
264 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138, 2143 (1992).
265 Hays, supra note 93, at 1001 (citations omitted). Hays stated:
The decision not to hear a case may impact agency action and governmental policy just as profoundly as a resolution of the case on its merits.
Whatever the constitutional basis which ought to underlie the standing
doctrine, the Court's selective use of standing doctrine has often restricted access to the federal courts without disclosing the basis for the
decision it has reached. This lack of candor conceals the policymaking
role of the court, a role as easily assumed by denying standing to litigate
as by conferring standing and allowing a suit to continue to a decision
on the merits.
Id. (citations omitted).
266 See id. at 1021 (citation omitted).
267 Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2135; see supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the agency rule challenged in Defenders).
268 See generally, Nichol, supra note 70, at 1929-39 (discussing the inability of the
Court to address distinctions between judicially cognizable and non-cognizable interests using the current "injury in fact" element of the standing test).
269 See supra notes 57-100 and accompanying text (explaining Article III's standing
requirements).

1994]

313

COMMENT

Congress has already legislated a solution by including citizen
suit provisions in almost every environmental statute.2 70 This came
perhaps with the recognition that Congress could not count on the
executive branch to faithfully execute the laws of the nation. 1
The decision may also reflect the legislature's understanding that
the Court was actively undermining the role of the public in the
protection of the environment by unnecessarily constraining standing doctrine. 2 72 Irrespective of the difficulties that continue to
plague environmental litigation, the Supreme Court's understanding of the fundamental nature of environmental injuries must keep
step with science. The Court must reflect this understanding with
a change in the procedural impediments erected to constrain judicial review of agency action in the environmental arena. The
realm of standing must be first in line.
Eric L Abraham

270 See supra note 43 (setting forth the citizen suit provisions of federal environmental statutes).
271 U.S. CONs-r. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed").
272 In an article discussing the effects of another devastating environmental opinion authored by Justice Scalia, ProfessorJoseph Sax speculated that the majority opinion was specifically crafted to undermine the viability of ecological regulations.
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: UndertandingLucas v. South

Carolina Coastal Commission, 45 STAN. L. Rxv. 1433, 1438-42 (1993).

